Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 by Pritchard, A. C.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 78 
Issue 2 The Changing Structure of Securities Regulation 
January 2000 
Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 
A. C. Pritchard 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Legislation Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
A. C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 435 (2000). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/5 
This F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the 
Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington 
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
435 
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM, INDIVIDUAL 
LIBERTY, AND THE SECURITIES LITIGATION 
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF 1998 
A.C. PRITCHARD* 
Constitutional federalism has been called back from its deathbed by the 
United States Supreme Court. After half a century of deference to the growth 
of federal power at the expense of the states, the last decade has seen a 
reversal. In a series of cases beginning in 1991, the Supreme Court has 
consistently rebuffed Congress’s attempts to interfere with state sovereignty.1 
Federalism once again matters to the Supreme Court.2 
For a time, it appeared that the Court’s efforts to protect federalism 
reflected a broader political current favoring government decentralization. 
When the Republican Party took control of Congress in 1994, there was talk 
of returning authority to the states and relieving the burdens that the federal 
government had imposed on them.3 Congress even passed the Unfunded 
Mandates Act, erecting certain procedural obstacles to federal legislation 
 
 
 * Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School; Council of Scholars, Foundation 
for Economic Education. J.D., University of Virginia; M.P.P., University of Chicago. Email: 
acplaw@umich.edu. I would like to thank Evan Caminker, Ellen Katz, Joan Larsen, and Ronald Mann 
for helpful comments and discussion on the ideas presented here. Lacey Calhoun provided helpful 
research assistance. The Cook Fund of the University of Michigan Law School provided financial 
support for this project. Full disclosure: the author was previously Senior Counsel in the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s Office of General Counsel, and in that capacity assisted in preparing the 
SEC’s response to the bills that eventually became the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. 
The SEC, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any 
of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Commission or of the author’s former colleagues on the staff of the Commission. See 17 
C.F.R. § 200.735-4(e)(2) (1998). 
 1. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Exp. Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). These cases are discussed below, at infra  notes 78-173 and 
accompanying text. 
 2. See Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1998) (“Today, judicial protection of constitutional federalism is more secure 
than it has been at any time since the New Deal, although the Court majority committed to 
constitutional federalism remains a very narrow one.”). 
 3. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2238 (1998) (“[T]he 1994 elections appeared to give a mandate to the 
Republican Contract with America and its promises to return power to the states”); Richard W. 
Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 
84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (“Ironically, the Congress that now preempts these state [securities 
fraud] remedies has been committed to federalism in almost every other area of legislation.”). 
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seeking to impose obligations on state governments without providing 
funding to help satisfy those obligations.4 This commitment to federalism 
waned, however, when policy initiatives—that promised substantial 
campaign contributions from firms that would benefit from the legislation—
required abridgment of state authority.5 Proposals to preempt state products 
liability law, tobacco lawsuits, and other areas were bandied about by 
Congress. One proposed bill would have allowed the removal of all class 
actions to federal court by any defendant or non-representative plaintiff 
whenever one member of the plaintiff class was a citizen of a different state 
than any defendant.6 State substantive law would still be applied, but would 
be subject to federal procedural rules. While these proposals have garnered a 
steady stream of campaign revenue for members of Congress, they ultimately 
have failed, hindered by the lobbying clout of the plaintiffs’ bar.7 
One initiative, however, has managed to survive the attorneys’ gauntlet. 
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“Uniform Act”) was 
enacted by Congress in 1998.8 The Uniform Act preempts securities fraud 
 
 
 4. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 
see Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113 (1997). For a more general discussion of the subject of 
unfunded mandates, see Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 1137 (1997); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the 
Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355 
(1993). 
 5. This was a rather predictable response. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local 
Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of 
Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990). 
Conservatives and liberals alike extol the virtues of state autonomy whenever deference to the 
states happens to serve their political needs at a particular moment. Yet both groups are also quick 
to wield the power of the supremacy clause, while citing vague platitudes about the need for 
uniformity among the states, whenever a single national rule in a particular area furthers their 
political interests.  
See id . at 265. See also  U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL 
STATUTORY PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY : HISTORY , INVENTORY, AND ISSUES 38 
(1992) (“As business has come to recognize the political inevitability of regulation, and as states (and 
many local governments) have become more energetic regulators in the face of consumer pressure, 
business has increasingly sought federal preemption of state and local powers.”); Cheryl Bolen, 
McIntosh Federalism Legislation On Hold Until Organizations Can Meet, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1300 (Oct. 1, 1999) (reporting opposition of U.S. Chamber of Commerce to proposed 
legislation creating presumption against preemption). 
 6. H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 7. See The Lawyers’ Party, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1999, at A26 (criticizing influence of trial 
lawyers over Democratic Party politics). For critiques of efforts to reduce state regulation through 
federal preemption, see Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State 
Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997); Nim Razook, The Perils of Pragmatic Preemption: A 
Caution About Using Efficiency Norms in Federal Preemption Decisions, 15 J.L. & POL. 37 (1999). 
 8. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227. 
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class actions based on state law for certain nationally-traded securities. 
Congress adopted the Uniform Act in response to the tactic of using state 
court class actions to evade the obstacles to federal securities class actions 
erected by Congress in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“Reform Act”).9 Congress, motivated by a concerted lobbying effort from 
the high tech industry,10 was concerned that the migration of securities class 
actions to state court could lead to a non-uniform, and likely lower, standard 
for proving securities fraud. 
Congress did not, however, use the Uniform Act to preempt the 
substantive law of state securities fraud or its remedies. Instead, it preempted 
a certain procedure employed by state courts in adjudicating securities fraud 
cases, namely, class actions. In targeting only securities fraud class actions, 
Congress left state law to provide a cause of action for securities fraud, albeit 
one that can only be pursued individually. 
This peculiar form of selective preemption gives rise to the constitutional 
question addressed by this Article. Congress clearly has the power to 
preempt all state fraud law as it applies to nationally-traded securities, as the 
existence of national trading markets provides a sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce.11 And Congress has the authority to preempt all, not just 
 
 
 9. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (Oct. 9, 1998) (“The purpose of this title is to prevent 
plaintiffs from seeking to evade the protections that Federal law provides against abusive litigation by 
filing suit in State, rather than in Federal, court.”). The Reform Act is the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). The Reform Act made it more difficult to successfully allege securities fraud by: (1) 
adopting a more stringent pleading standard, including heightened requirements for pleading scienter, 
i.e., state of mind; and (2) creating an automatic stay of discovery. See generally Richard H. Walker et 
al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641 (1997). 
 10. See Painter, supra note 3, at 4-5 (“[T]he high technology companies of Silicon Valley, one of 
the largest  defendant groups in securities fraud class actions, made substantial political contributions 
and lobbied for preemption.”).  
 11. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (holding 
that courts must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, 
if the finding has any rational basis). Professor Manning Warren claims that the Uniform Act exceeds 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power because 
“fraud-related remedies granted by the states and asserted by investors are by their nature activated 
after the fact of the commercial transactions giving rise to their assertion. While these remedies 
may have incidental regulatory effects, they do not regulate commerce but, rather, accomplish the 
entirely separate function of compensating the victims of fraud.”  
 Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection: Constitutional Restraints on 
Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud, 60 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 169, 198 (1997). 
There is no basis in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, nor any economic theory, for the 
temporal distinction that Warren claims between securities transactions and lawsuits arising out of 
those transactions. It should be obvious to even the casual observer that the threat of potential state 
litigation is likely to have an effect on the ex ante expectations of participants in the interstate 
securities markets. The cumulative effect of the threat of litigation plainly authorizes Congress’s 
exercise of its Commerce Clause power. Warren’s suggestion that state regulation not precluded by the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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inconsistent, state regulation.12 But Congress was reluctant to take this drastic 
step because of the important role that state fraud law and state courts play in 
resolving securities disputes between individuals. Congress sought to 
discourage only class actions against the corporate issuer and its affiliates, 
with their potential for enormous damages. The form of preemption chosen 
was closely matched to the perceived problem of these suits migrating to 
state courts. 
But while Congress’s solution was carefully tailored to the problem it 
perceived, that solution may run afoul of principles of constitutional 
federalism. Specifically, restricting procedures that state courts may use in 
administering state law causes of action raises the question of Congress’s 
authority to dictate how the states will organize their judicial process. The 
longstanding “general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of 
state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state 
courts as it finds them.”13 Whether this general rule has a constitutional basis 
is unclear, and consequently, it is uncertain whether the rule binds Congress. 
Moreover, there are exceptions to the rule when a state has discriminated 
against a federal cause of action or adopted a procedure that would defeat a 
federal claim. It is also unclear whether these exceptions would cover the 
Uniform Act, which applies only to state law claims. The Uniform Act 
therefore raises a novel question of constitutional law: Does Congress have 
the power to regulate how a state court adjudicates a state law cause of 
action?14 
 
 
Dormant Commerce Clause cannot be preempted by Congress exercising its Commerce Clause 
authority is foreclosed for similar reasons. See Warren, supra  at 199-200. 
 12. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981). 
 13. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 
508 (1954), cited with approval in Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990). 
 14. While novel, this question has implications for other areas of law. See, e.g., Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a) (1988) (specifying venue limitations for state law debt 
collection actions brought in either state or federal court). It was also proposed to preclude state courts 
from adjudicating class actions in connection with the proposed tobacco settlement. See generally 
Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 
VILL. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1999) (discussing proposals to federalize tobacco litigation). This proposal raised 
serious constitutional questions. See Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to 
Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 
108-9 (1998). 
[W]ere Congress to enact a law prohibiting multi-party product liability actions in state court 
against tobacco manufacturers, Congress would in effect direct state courts to employ specific 
procedures in enforcing their own substantive tort law in their own courts. Whether one views the 
issue from the perspective of congressional power under Article I or from that of the Tenth 
Amendment protection of states’ rights, it is by no means clear that Congress possesses the 
constitutional authority to impose such restrictions.  
Id. 
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the 
historical development of constitutional federalism, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in this area, and the apparent demise of constitutional limits on 
federal power. Part II then reviews the Court’s revival of constitutional 
federalism over the last decade. Based on this review, I argue that the 
Supreme Court’s current federalism doctrine can be understood as a 
“constrained libertarianism” that attempts to use constitutional structure as a 
check on government interference with individual liberty. In this model, 
states are respected in our constitutional system because of the counter-
balance that they provide to federal power. State autonomy is valuable 
because it discourages excessive federal regulation.15 The Court’s 
constitutional federalism is constrained, however, by its earlier concession of 
a general police power to the Congress. The Court essentially abdicated its 
responsibility to restrain Congress’s power at the time of the New Deal. That 
abdication severely constrains the Court’s constitutional federalism today. 
Part III focuses on the Court’s decisions applying the principles of 
constitutional federalism to state courts. It compares Congress’s greater 
authority over state courts with the limited power that Congress wields over 
state legislatures and executives, and explores the limits of that authority over 
state courts. Part IV provides background to Congress’s enactment of the 
Uniform Act and explains why it adopted the form of preemption that it did. 
It then applies the constrained libertarianism theory of constitutional 
federalism developed in Parts II and III of this Article to the Uniform Act. 
I conclude that the Uniform Act is consistent with principles of 
constitutional federalism because its preemption results in less, rather than 
more, government interference with private conduct. That this unusual form 
of conditional preemption eliminates a state procedure, rather than a 
substantive law, should make no difference in the constitutional analysis. 
This preemption enhances liberty because it eliminates a secondary, and 
potentially inconsistent, level of government regulation. Individuals are more 
free if they have to deal with one level of government, rather than two, in 
managing their affairs. Having ceded to Congress the complete authority to 
regulate interstate securities markets, and thereby affording Congress the 
additional authority to restrict state courts in this area, the Uniform Act 
 
 
 15. I do not attempt to provide a normative justification for the judicial protection of liberty here. 
While some readers may disagree with this normative proposition, discussion of the point would make 
an excessively long article still longer. Those interested should see RANDY E. BARNETT, THE 
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1998). For 
those who disagree with protection of liberty as a normative matter, my “constrained libertarian” 
interpretation may help make sense of the Court’s occasionally confusing constitutional federalism 
jurisprudence. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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enhances individual liberty because eliminating state regulation enhances 
individuals’ choices. State regulation cannot reduce, but can only 
supplement, the baseline of federal regulation. Eliminating state regulation 
reduces the overall amount of government. Therefore, the constrained 
libertarianism theory supports a broad preemption power. Finally, the 
Conclusion offers some thoughts on Congress’s preemptive power over state 
courts in a world where markets are increasingly operating globally, rather 
than nationally. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM  
A. Origins 
Federalism owes its constitutional status in our political system more to 
practical politics than to political theory. When the Framers convened in 
Philadelphia in 1787, the states were established entities, with roots going 
deep into the colonial era. The national government, by contrast, could trace 
its roots back no further than a decade, to the convening of the first 
Continental Congress. Worse yet, the national government had quickly 
established a reputation for being ineffective under the Articles of 
Confederation, unable to accomplish those governmental functions that were 
more effectively done at the national level.16 Given this background, 
preservation of the states’ autonomy was not merely a useful political 
innovation, but necessary for the viability of any constitutional proposal.17 
Any plan that subordinated the states to mere administrative units of the 
federal government would have met a quick death when sent out to the states 
for ratification. Thus, the states retained “a residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty” under the new Constitution, “no more subject, within their 
respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is 
subject to them, within its own sphere.”18 
James Madison and the other authors of The Federalist Papers, all skilled 
rhetoricians, transformed this necessity into a virtue: 
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the 
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the 
 
 
 16. See Jack N. Rakove, The First Phases of American Federalism , in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA  1, 5-6 (Mark Tushnet, ed., 1990). 
 17. The Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected proposals by Hamilton and others to 
eliminate the states quasi-sovereign status. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1367-1368 (1997). 
 18. The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/5
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portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate 
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. 
The different governments will control each other, at the same time 
that each will be controlled by itself.19 
This concept of “dual sovereignty”—separate and distinct spheres of 
national and state authority—meant that states would be vigilant monitors of 
attempts by the national government to expand its authority beyond those 
powers enumerated in the Constitution. Any addition to federal authority 
would imply a subtraction from state authority.20 Thus, the constitutional 
federalism of dual sovereignty enlisted the states as guardians of individual 
liberty against federal encroachment. At the same time, competition among 
the states and constitutional limits on state power would restrict state 
encroachments on individual liberty.21 
Hamilton argued that the states would protect liberty in another fashion. 
He saw the states as focal points for organizing the people’s opposition to 
overreaching by the national government. 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government 
will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state 
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the 
general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either 
scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded 
by either, they can make use of the other as an instrument of redress.22 
While Madison and Hamilton agreed that the states would help protect 
liberty, they foresaw different mechanisms by which the states could act. 
Madison’s argument assumes legal limits on the federal government’s power, 
perhaps enforceable in court, while Hamilton’s argument seems to rely on 
 
 
 19. The Federalist No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 20. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 
654 (1993) (“Both sides to the debate were hampered by their shared assumption that ‘sovereignty’ 
was a unitary and exclusive quality, capable neither of division nor of joint tenancy. Sovereignty 
meant control, and the ‘logic of the doctrine of sovereignty required either the state legislatures or the 
national Congress to predominate.’”).  
 21. See John McGinnis, The Boundaries of Legislative Power, 13 J.L. & POL. 588, 589 (1997) 
(“[T]he federal government was restrained by the Constitution, and the states were restrained by 
competition that the federal government maintained through keeping open the avenues of trade and 
investment.”). 
 22. The Federalist No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also 
Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2180, 2219 (1998) (“Particularly given judicially enforceable traditions of regular and free voting 
and of a free press, states need not threaten the use of military force in order to provide structures for 
development and organized expression of countervailing positions to those of the national 
government.”). 
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the political process, fueled by popular pressure. This difference was not 
resolved at the time,23 but has played a crucial role in disputes over the role 
of constitutional federalism in the late Twentieth Century. 
B. The Decline of Dual Sovereignty 
This notion of dual sovereignty prevailed for many years after the 
Constitution was adopted, restraining both the federal and state 
governments.24 But the premise of the dual sovereignty argument, that state 
and federal authority were separate, rather than overlapping, was eventually 
exposed as its weakest link. Dual sovereignty began to fray as the national 
government sought to expand its authority in the post-Civil War era. The 
13th, 14th and 15th Amendments explicitly shifted the line between state and 
federal authority giving Congress a variety of tools with which to protect the 
civil liberties of the newly-freed slaves from state encroachment.25 
The more fundamental expansion of national authority was not reflected 
in any constitutional amendment, but was instead adversely possessed as a 
result of the federal government continually pushing the boundaries of its 
authority. Technological advances of the Nineteenth Century made it 
possible to organize business on a national level in many industries.26 
Consequently, national politicians began to see opportunities to extract rents 
from those industries. Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act’s 
cartelization of the railroad industry,27 followed soon thereafter by the 
Sherman Act’s rent extraction from technologically innovative national 
producers such as Standard Oil,28 Congress began to look for ways to 
redistribute wealth generated by the increasingly national economy. 
At the same time, states looked to create or protect rents by protecting 
local producers from out-of-state competitors. The field of securities laws 
 
 
 23. See Yoo, supra note 17, at 1381-91 (providing history of debate over protections of state 
sovereignty). 
 24. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism , 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1491 (1994) (“There 
was, in fact, a time when the Supreme Court flirted with the idea of establishing absolute, mutually 
exclusive domains for the state and federal governments.”). 
 25. See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A 
Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism , 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1464 (1995) (“Whatever 
viability the Framers’ libertarian theory had for federalism originally, it has been overtaken by the 
rights-based libertarian approach followed since the Civil War.”). 
 26. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism , 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 369 (1997) (“Rapid 
advances in communications, transportation, and industrialization brought us together as a nation and 
forced reconsideration of the rules by which we governed ourselves.”). 
 27. See George W. Hilton, The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 87, 
87-99 (1966). 
 28. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/5
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provides an apt example. Beginning in the early part of the Twentieth 
Century, states adopted “blue sky” laws imposing disclosure and other 
regulatory hurdles on businesses seeking capital from investors in those 
states.29 These barriers to entry protected well-organized local consumers of 
capital, primarily local banks and farmers, from competition, thus keeping 
their price of capital low.30 
Both rent creation and rent extraction require the power to regulate. Rent 
creation requires regulation to exclude competitors, while rent extraction 
requires a credible threat of regulation.31 These conflicting demands for 
regulatory authority soon led to conflict between state and federal power.32 
The line between state and national authority was being pushed from both 
directions, and the Supreme Court struggled with the effort to draw it. Even 
in the face of the national economic crisis of the Great Depression, the Court 
endeavored to maintain a strict separation between the spheres of state and 
national power.33 Franklin Roosevelt’s threat to the Court’s independence, 
however, forced the Court to fold, eventually abandoning its efforts to limit 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.34 Indeed, the Court 
construed the Commerce Clause, in conjunction with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, so broadly that Congress was allowed to regulate conduct that 
 
 
 29. Kansas adopted the first blue sky law in 1911. See T HOMAS LEE HAZEN, T HE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 367 (2d ed. 1990). 
 30. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 
351 (1991) (“State banking regulators, interested in protecting and expanding their regulatory turf and 
in advancing the financial interests of banks under their supervision . . . [as well as] farmers and small 
business owners who saw the suppression of securities sales as a useful means for increasing their own 
access to bank credit.”). 
 31. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of 
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 passim (1987). 
 32. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1484, 1488 (1987) (“Constitutional limits expressed in terms of interstate consequences lead to 
different results when applied to railroads than when applied to a horse and buggy. As the size of the 
market has expanded, so has federal power.”). 
 33. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 296 (1935) (rejecting attempt by “the United 
States [to] impose cumulative penalties above and beyond those specified by State law for infractions 
of State’s criminal code by its own citizens. . . . The concession of such a power would open the door 
to unlimited regulation of matters of state concern by federal authority.”); Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 338 (1935) (setting aside, as an “illegitimate encroachment by the 
government of the nation upon a domain of activity set apart by the Constitution as the province of the 
states,” federal law allowing state-chartered S&L’s to switch to a federal charter). 
 34. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule 
of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1670-71 (1995) (arguing that the Court initially resisted the New 
Deal in hopes of generating a political backlash, only to back down when it became clear that the New 
Deal had strong support within Congress and the electorate); but see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the 
New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 passim (1994) (arguing that the judicial loosening of restrictions 
on Congress’s power was more gradual than is typically thought). 
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was neither commerce nor interstate.35 By cumulating individual instances of 
regulated activity, Congress was effectively given the equivalent of a general 
police power.36 State sovereignty placed no limit on that power.37 Distinct 
spheres of allocated power could no longer serve as the basis for the 
conclusion that the federal government could not interfere with state 
authority. 
C. The Era of Congressional Dominance 
Despite the predictions of Madison and Hamilton, the states did not rise 
up to protest the New Deal power grab by the federal government. Two 
factors contributed to silence the states. First, the states’ voice in federal 
government largely had been eliminated by the Seventeenth Amendment, 
which transferred the power to choose Senators from state legislatures to 
state voters.38 The result was to make Senators answer primarily to national, 
rather than local, interest groups.39 The second factor was the Court’s 
concession to state level rent seeking. At the same time that the Court was 
sanctioning Congress’s assumption of a general police power, it was freeing 
the states’ hands to extract rents from business and industry.40 Only a 
generation before, the Court had rejected state attempts to cartelize industry 
as inconsistent with the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Due Process 
 
 
 35. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of wheat 
grown for home consumption). See also Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 
T EX. L. REV. 795, 807-11 (1996) (discussing the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the 
expansion of federal power). 
 36. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (“Where the class of activities is 
regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as 
trivial, individual instances’ of the class.”). 
 37. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (the Tenth Amendment’s 
reservation of power to the states reflects “but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered.”). 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 39. See Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1039-41 (1994). See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro 
Transit. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that members of 
Congress answer to national, rather than state, constituencies); Calabresi, supra  note 2, at 1389 
Senators no longer represent the states as institutions; they represent popular majorities in each 
State and national factions that give senators money to advertise on television in their respective 
states. Many small state senators from both political parties raise most of their campaign funds 
from out of state. These senators thus are often more beholden to national corporate and labor 
political action committees than they are to the voters who nominally elect them. 
Id. 
 40. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 
U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 506-32 (1997). 
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Clause.41 The New Deal Court, however, abandoned the effort to protect 
individuals from wealth redistribution by the states.42 That Court also 
tolerated states’ efforts to regulate what earlier Courts had held to be 
interstate commerce, and thus, the province of the federal government.43 
Finally, the New Deal Court overruled Swift v. Tyson,44 thereby making state 
supreme courts the final arbiters of state common law.45 This freed state 
supreme courts to use the common law as a tool of social policy. Thus, the 
states were given a far greater domain in which to seek rents, at both the 
legislative and judicial level, to compensate for occasional federal incursions 
into what had previously been the states’ exclusive territory. 
The expansion of national power inevitably led to a narrowing of residual 
state subject matter authority, and the Court consistently sided with the 
national government over the states.46 The Court soon abandoned any real 
pretense of constraining Congress’s spending power,47 and left Congress free 
to attach conditions to funds that states receive when administering a federal 
program.48 The Court also gave Congress broad authority to preempt state 
law, stating that “any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness 
of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause.”49 These twin 
 
 
 41. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 42. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 43. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 
125, 167-68 (discussing the narrowed scope of preemption brought on by the New Deal Court). 
 44. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 45. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). “Congress has no power to declare 
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 
‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution 
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.” Id. at 78. 
 46. In the few cases that arose before this time the states received a more sympathetic hearing. 
See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1911) (holding that Congress could not dictate the location of 
Oklahoma’s state capital after it had been admitted as a state). 
 47. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (“[O]bjectives not thought to be within 
Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields’, may nevertheless be attained through the use of the 
spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”); Lessig, supra  note 43, at 188-190 
(arguing that the Court’s rules on Congressional spending impose no constraint at all). 
 48. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790 (1983) (“Requiring States to honor the obligations 
voluntarily assumed as a condition of federal funding before recognizing their ownership of funds 
simply does not intrude on their sovereignty.”). While Congress is free to impose conditions on federal 
spending, the states are free to refuse the money if the conditions are too onerous. The result is 
bargaining between state and federal officials over the terms of the grant. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., 
The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual 
Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH . L. REV. 813, 861-65 (1998) (discussing the constitutionality of 
conditions on federal grants). On the subject of congressionally placed conditions on the receipt of 
federal funds, see generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1911 (1995); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan 
Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85.  
 49. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971). The development of the Court’s preemption 
doctrine is discussed in Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 
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powers of preemption and conditional spending give Congress tremendous 
leverage over state regulatory authority.50 
Other aspects of state sovereignty were brought under Congress’s 
discretion in the post-New Deal era. When New York State went into the 
business of selling bottled water, the Court found no impediment to 
Congress’s imposing an excise tax on the water, as long as it imposed the 
same tax on water sold by private parties.51 Thus, while New York was 
protected from being singled out by the federal government, it could not 
assert immunity from taxation based solely on its status as an independent 
sovereign.52 
D. The Death of Constitutional Federalism? 
A series of cases from the 1980s appeared to signal the ultimate demise of 
federalism limits on Congress’s power. The first is Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc.53 The Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 (“Reclamation Act”) established national policy for 
the control of the environmental effects of strip mining.54 Under the 
Reclamation Act, “any State wishing to assume permanent regulatory 
authority over the surface coal mining operations . . . within its borders must 
submit a proposed permanent program to the Secretary [of the Interior].”55 
The Secretary was to approve the program only if the state legislature had 
enacted laws reflecting congressionally adopted environmental standards. If 
the state failed to submit a program, the Secretary was directed to develop a 
 
 
785-807 (1994). 
 50. The federal courts also have substantial power over the states, as it is a “settled principle that 
federal courts may enjoin unconstitutional action by state officials.” Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 
219, 228 (1987). As states can only act through their agents, this is a substantial constraint on state 
regulation. 
 51. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (“[S]o long as Congress generally 
taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a 
State, the Constitution of the United States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on 
a State.”). 
 52. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 525 (1988) (upholding non-discriminatory tax 
imposed on income from bonds issued by state, concluding that: “States have no constitutional 
entitlement to issue bonds paying lower interest rates than other issuers.”). This rule applies even if the 
tax applies to “traditional” governmental functions. See also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 
444 (1978) (upholding application of a general tax on a civil aircraft to helicopters used by state 
police). 
 53. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
 54. See Surface Mining Control and Reclaimation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997). 
 55. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 271. 
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permanent federal regulatory program for that state.56 Thus, states were 
allowed to regulate in the area only if the state legislature enacted federal 
policy as state law. 
Virginia challenged this aspect of the Reclamation Act as violating the 
Tenth Amendment. The Court rejected the claim, stating that: 
[T]he states are not compelled to enforce the . . . standards, to expend 
any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in 
any manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a proposed 
permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing 
regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal 
Government. Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act 
commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.57 
As long as Congress did not require the states to regulate, the Court saw 
no difficulty with Congress dictating how the states regulated, if the states 
chose to do so. Given that Congress had the greater power to preempt state 
regulation altogether, no constitutional problem arose when it exercised the 
lesser power to specify the mode of state regulation.58 States would regulate 
according to the federal standards only if they had an independent policy 
interest in doing so. Otherwise, regulation would be a federal responsibility. 
Congress’s power to control state regulation of private parties was 
confirmed emphatically the following term in FERC v. Mississippi.59 The 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”)60 required state 
regulators to “‘consider’ the adoption and implementation of specific ‘rate 
design’ and regulatory standards;” follow certain notice and comment 
procedures in considering the proposed federal standards; and resolve 
disputes among regulated parties arising out of the implementation of those 
standards.61 Mississippi challenged the law as exceeding Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power and violating the Tenth Amendment.62 The Court 
quickly dismissed Mississippi’s argument that the state’s “governance of 
commerce”63 was beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. The state’s 
 
 
 56. See id. at 272. 
 57. Id. at 288. 
 58. See id. at 290. 
 59. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
 60. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).  
 61. 456 U.S. at 746-48. 
 62. See id. at 752. 
 63. Id. at 755.  
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claim was undercut by Congress’s finding that the use of electric power 
affected interstate commerce, and the Court found that this finding was not 
irrational.64 The Court’s long-standing deference to federal power determined 
this outcome. 
The Tenth Amendment challenge required more substantial discussion. 
The Court described Congress’s “attempts to use state regulatory machinery 
to advance federal goals” as raising “an issue of first impression.”65 The 
enlistment of state utility commissioners to resolve disputes among private 
parties was unobjectionable because “[d]ispute resolution of this kind is the 
very type of activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi Public 
Service Commission.”66 The principle that state courts could not discriminate 
against federal claims was held to apply to state agencies as well, as long 
they were given adjudicative responsibilities under state law.67 The 
requirement that states consider rate making standards and follow certain 
procedures in doing so was supported by the conditional preemption 
rationale that resolved Hodel: 
[I]f a State has no utilities commission, or simply stops regulating in 
the field, it need not even entertain the federal proposals. 
. . . Congress could have pre-empted the field, at least insofar as 
private rather than state activity is concerned; PURPA should not be 
invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress 
adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the states to continue 
regulating in the area on the condition that they consider the suggested 
federal standards.68 
Once again, Congress was not compelling the state to regulate, only 
imposing certain conditions on states that chose to regulate. The Court 
attached no constitutional significance to the fact that Congress had made no 
provision for regulating the utilities if the states failed to adopt the federal 
standards, deeming any coercion reflected in the choice between abandoning 
 
 
 64. See id. at 755-58. 
 65. Id. at 759. 
 66. Id. at 760. 
 67. See id. at 760-61. 
That the Commission has administrative as well as judicial duties is of no significance. Any other 
conclusion would allow the States to disregard both the preeminent position held by federal law 
throughout the Nation, and the congressional determination that the federal rights granted by 
PURPA can appropriately be enforced through state adjudicatory machinery. 
Id. On the principle of non-discrimination by state courts, see infra  at notes 190-195 and 
accompanying text. 
 68. Id. at 764-65. 
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regulation altogether or following federal standards constitutionally 
irrelevant.69 The weight of the state interest in regulating a particular area 
apparently did not enter into the constitutional calculus. 
The culmination of a half-century of congressional dominance over the 
states came in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.70 
Overturning a decision only a decade old that had appeared to give new life 
to the Tenth Amendment,71 the Court held that Congress was free to impose 
the same rules on state governments that it imposed on private actors. Given 
that the Court had long since abandoned any federalism limits on what 
Congress could constitutionally impose on private actors, this concession of 
power opened the door to dramatic incursions into state sovereignty. States 
were left to protect themselves, like individuals, through the political 
process.72 The Court took comfort in the demonstrated ability of the states to 
garner their share of federal revenues and to gain exemptions from a variety 
of otherwise generally applicable laws.73 Although the states had not 
obtained an exemption from the statute at issue, the burden was not onerous. 
The Court observed that the state agency “faces nothing more than the same 
minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of thousands of other 
employers, public as well as private, have to meet.”74 Lobbying, not lawsuits, 
was to be the bulwark of federalism.75 The dissenters fretted that the decision 
signaled the death of constitutional federalism and the independent 
sovereignty of the states.76 
 
 
 69. See id. at 766. 
 70. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 71. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 72. See Garcia , 469 U.S. at 552. “State sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by the 
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created 
limitations on federal power.” Id. 
 73. See id. at 552-54. 
 74. Id. at 554.  
 75. See id. at 556 (“[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that 
inherent in all congressional action–the built -in restraints that our system provides through state 
participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden 
the States will not be promulgated.”). 
 76. See id. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court’s opinion purports to recognize 
that the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify even a single aspect of state authority 
that would remain when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal regulation.”); Id. at 588 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If state autonomy is ignored in assessing the means by which Congress 
regulates matters affecting commerce, then federalism becomes irrelevant simply because the set of 
activities remaining beyond the reach of such a commerce power ‘may well be negligible.’”). 
Commentators have agreed. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 
MICH . L. REV. 1709 (1985). 
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II. FEDERALISM REVIVED 
Despite the seeming death knell sounded in Garcia, the 1990s have seen a 
revival of the judiciary’s role in policing congressional incursions into the 
sovereignty of the states. Two features of the Court’s decisions reviving 
constitutional federalism—one normative, the second doctrinal—are 
noteworthy. First, the decisions repeatedly invoke liberty as the goal of 
constitutional federalism. The Court’s explanations, however, tend to revolve 
around accountability, which has only a tenuous connection to liberty. The 
second feature of the Court’s constitutional federalism decisions is that they 
go to great lengths to establish their consistency with earlier doctrine. This 
respect for stare decisis creates a tension in the Court’s doctrine, as it 
continues to insist that dual sovereignty puts limits on the power of the 
federal government, but nonetheless defers to Congress’s power over 
individuals. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s deference to Congress, the Court’s 
constitutional federalism decisions do help to enlist the states in preserving 
liberty against overreaching by the federal government. Those decisions fall 
into four categories: (1) limits on Congress’s power; (2) the clear statement 
rule; (3) commandeering; and (4) sovereign immunity. The last three 
categories do not limit the federal government’s power directly, but instead 
limit indirectly by giving the states clear incentives and the means to resist 
attempts to expand federal power. Thus they combine Madison and 
Hamilton’s vision of the role of the states in preserving liberty.77 
A. Normative and Doctrinal Justification 
1. Constitutional Federalism and Individual Liberty 
The Court’s efforts to explain the relationship between constitutional 
federalism and individual liberty have been somewhat vague.78 For example, 
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, argued 
the following: 
 Though on the surface the idea may seem counterintuitive, it was 
the insight of the Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation 
of two governments, not one. . . .  
 
 
 77. For a discussion of Madison and Hamilton’s vision, see supra  notes 19-23 and accompanying 
text. 
 78. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 319 (“The values of federalism are invoked regularly in 
much the same way as ‘Mom’ and ‘apple pie’: warm images with little content.”). 
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 The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one 
requires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of 
political accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal 
Government; the second between the citizens and the States. If, as 
Madison expected, the [f]ederal and [s]tate [g]overnments are to 
control each other, and hold each other in check by competing for the 
affections of the people, those citizens must have some means of 
knowing which of the two governments to hold accountable for the 
failure to perform a given function. . . . Were the Federal Government 
to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, 
areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial 
activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state 
authority would blur and political responsibility would become 
illusory. The resultant inability to hold either branch of the 
government answerable to the citizens is more dangerous even than 
devolving too much authority to the remote central power.79 
So, while Justice Kennedy claims liberty as his ultimate normative 
justification for constitutional federalism, his argument is couched much 
more in terms of accountability. Justice Kennedy leaves it unclear how 
accountability, absent meaningful limits on federal power, will preserve 
freedom. In particular, he does not explain how accountability to the 
electorate can be translated into freedom for individuals. Kennedy suggests 
that clear lines of authority will encourage the electorate to sanction the 
federal government for overreaching. But the point is hardly self-evident; 
perhaps greater accountability to the voters will lead to more government 
regulation, rather than less, as politicians redouble their efforts to pander to 
interest groups. Democracy may be compatible with individual liberty, but 
the concepts are far from equivalent.80 If the protection of liberty is the goal, 
the political process seems a poor substitute for the right of an individual or a 
State to seek a federal court order enjoining a power grab by the federal 
government.81 
 
 
 79. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (citations omitted). 
 80. For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between the two, see Rebecca L. Brown, 
Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 571-78 (1998). 
 81. Kennedy again invoked accountability in a later case protecting state sovereign immunity: 
“[I]f the principle of representative government is to be preserved to the States, the balance between 
competing interests must be reached after deliberation by the political process established by the 
citizens of the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the 
private citizen.” See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Political accountability was in turn justified 
by the court as “essential to our liberty and republican form of government.” Id. As in his prior effort, 
however, Kennedy did not further elaborate on the supposed connection. 
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Justice O’Connor, perhaps the Court’s staunchest defender of federalism, 
has also invoked liberty as the goal of constitutional federalism, but like 
Justice Kennedy, her account relies much more heavily on accountability. In 
Gregory v. Ashcroft,82 Justice O’Connor was realistic about the limits that the 
Court could place on congressional aggrandizement: 
One fairly can dispute whether our federalist system has been quite as 
successful in checking government abuse as Hamilton promised, but 
there is no doubt about the design.  . . . [T]o be effective, there must be 
a proper balance between the States and the Federal Government. 
These twin powers will act as mutual restraints only if both are 
credible. In the tension between federal and state power lies the 
promise of liberty. 
 The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in this delicate 
balance: the Supremacy Clause. As long as it is acting within the 
powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its 
will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally 
regulated by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist 
system.83 
Despite the difficulties in placing limits on federal power, O’Connor 
argued that dual sovereignty offered a number of advantages: (1) “a 
decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a 
heterogenous society;” (2) “opportunity for citizen involvement in 
democratic processes;” (3) “more innovation and experimentation in 
government;” and (4) “it makes government more responsive by putting the 
States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”84 The first three purposes, while 
perhaps normatively justifiable in their own right, turn on accountability, not 
liberty, as they go to government’s accuracy in registering citizen preferences 
and efficiency in translating those preferences into policy. Only the last of 
these purposes potentially serves the cause of individual liberty. Citizens of 
states with overreaching governments (e.g., Massachusetts) will flee to more 
laissez-faire regimes (e.g., New Hampshire). But this purpose protects 
 
 
 82. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).  
 83. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459-60 (citation omitted). The Court’s realism about its ability to 
restrain Congress is reflected in an earlier concurrence by Justice Rehnquist:  
It is illuminating for purposes of reflection, if not for argument, to note that one of the greatest 
‘fictions’ of our federal system is that the Congress exercises only those powers delegated to it, 
while the remainder are reserved to the States or to the people. . .. [O]ne could easily get the sense 
from this Court’s opinions that the federal system exists only at the sufferance of Congress.  
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 307 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  
 84. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
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individuals only from state interference, not federal.85 
Encouraging competition among the states stands in considerable tension 
with the Court’s previous identification of the prevention of “destructive 
interstate competition” as “a traditional role for congressional action under 
the Commerce Clause.”86 When Congress regulates, it eliminates (or at least 
reduces) state competition, whether that competition advanced or diminished 
individual liberty. The Court makes no effort to distinguish which of the two 
effects dominates, but instead defers to congressional power.87 And that 
power has been invoked more frequently to reduce the range of individual 
choice.88 Given the acceptance by both Kennedy and O’Connor of this broad 
 
 
 85. See Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets? 83 VA. 
L.  REV. 1521, 1558 (1997) (“Competitive subnational governments without a strong central 
government have little incentive to engage in redistribution to the poor.”). Thus, efforts at 
redistribution will be channeled toward the federal level. See Kramer, supra note 24, at 1549-50.  
[T]he ability to limit immigration, coupled with the power to regulate the economy, makes it 
easier for Congress to take equity into account alongside efficiency. As a result, political pressures 
for redistribution tend to get channeled to the national level–a movement seen today in areas like 
taxation, welfare benefits, health, and even education. 
Id. There is room for doubt, however, whether these redistributions will be from the rich to the poor. 
See DAVID L. SHAPIRO , FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 79 (1995). [T]he ability to achieve “redistribution 
of the nation’s wealth”—one widely heralded advantage of national over state authority—is more 
likely than not to take the form of redistribution from the less organized to the more concentrated, 
better financed, more cohesive groups. The history of national subsidies in a wide range of situations 
supports the validity of this view. Id. The effect of that competition among the states is disputed. 
Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race To Protect 
Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1173-74 (1999) (arguing that competition 
among states for corporate charters encourages laxity in regulation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (1992) (arguing that “state competition is likely to fail with respect to 
certain important issues that state corporate law has traditionally governed”) with Robert Daines, Does 
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? (1999) (unpublished manuscript) (finding empirical evidence that 
Delaware law adds value); Mary E. Kostel, Note, A Public Choice: Perspective on the Debate over 
Federal Versus State Corporate Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2130 (1993) (arguing that “interest groups 
are as likely to skew legislation toward management interests—and away from shareholder’s 
interests—at the federal level as at the state level”). 
 86. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282. 
 87. See e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988) (“[N]othing in Garcia or the 
Tenth Amendment authorizes courts to second-guess the substantive basis for congressional 
legislation.”). 
 88. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism 
After Garcia , 1985 SUP.  CT.  REV. 341, 410-11 (discussing federal government’s advantage in 
facilitating wealth transfers). For this reason, states may in fact prefer to have their discretion 
eliminated by uniform federal policies. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: 
May Congress Commandeer State Officers To Implement Federal Law? , 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 
1012 (1995). 
[D]ecentralized decisionmaking may even lead a state to eschew policies that it truly desires for 
fear that they will influence a mobile citizenry and commercial-industrial base to react in ways 
that undermine local welfare. A state might decide not to adopt regulatory standards that entail 
substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic development out of concern that the 
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federal power, we can question whether their invocation of liberty as the goal 
of constitutional federalism is genuine, or simply a rhetorical flourish meant 
to make accountability seem more attractive. 
Justice O’Connor’s focus seems to be limiting abuse of power, rather than 
limiting power per se. She identified “the principal benefit of the federalist 
system” as “a check on abuses of government power.”89 She analogized to 
the separation of powers at the federal level, relying upon The Federalist as 
her authority for the proposition that the division of power preserves 
freedom, without specifying just how that mechanism might work.90 Justice 
O’Connor urged this point again in New York v. United States91 with no 
greater specificity.92 Indeed, her vagueness on this point led the dissent to 
dismiss the invocation of liberty as resort “to generalities and platitudes about 
the purpose of federalism being to protect individual rights.”93 
Justice Scalia also relied on liberty as a normative justification in Printz v. 
United States.94 He argued that the “separation of the two spheres is one of 
the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty. . . . The power of the 
Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to 
impress into its service–and at no cost to itself–the police officers of the 50 
States.”95 Prohibiting the federal government from conscripting the states 
limits government because it precludes Congress from going off budget to 
fund its agenda. Scalia’s reference to the states’ police powers suggests that 
commandeering might also be an end-run around the Constitution’s 
limitation of Congress to enumerated powers. Both of these concerns are 
consistent with a liberty-enhancing vision of constitutional federalism. 
In the Court’s recent sovereign immunity cases, Justice Scalia once again 
 
 
welfare gains to state residents from the regulation will be more than offset by the exit of capital to 
other states imposing less rigorous standards.  
Id. 
 89. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
 90. See id. at 458-59 (citing both The Federalist No. 28 (Hamilton) & No. 51 (Madison). For a 
discussion of The Federalist No. 28 and No. 51, see supra  notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
 91. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  
 92. See New York, 505 U.S. at 181. 
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state 
governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing 
the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state 
governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: 
“Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.”  
Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
 93. Id. at 206 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 94. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
 95. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921. 
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invoked individual liberty. He did not spare his sarcasm in taking the 
dissenters to task for espousing a concept of liberty—participation in 
democratic decision-making—unknown to the framers of the Constitution: 
 The proposition that “the protection of liberty” is most directly 
achieved by “promoting the sharing among citizens of governmental 
decision-making authority” might well have dropped from the lips of 
Robespierre, but surely not from those of Madison, Jefferson, or 
Hamilton, whose north star was that governmental power, even—
indeed, especially—governmental power wielded by the people, had 
to be dispersed and countered. And to say that the degree of dispersal 
to the States, and hence the degree of check by the States, is to be 
governed by Congress’s need for “legislative flexibility” is to deny 
federalism utterly. . . . Legislative flexibility on the part of Congress 
will be the touchstone of federalism when the capacity to support 
combustion becomes the acid test of a fire extinguisher. Congressional 
flexibility is desirable, of course—but only within the bounds of 
federal power established by the Constitution. Beyond those bounds 
(the theory of our Constitution goes), it is a menace.96 
Liberty, in Scalia’s view, required keeping government power within its 
constitutional bounds, not democratic participation in the direction of federal 
power.97 Thus, Justice Scalia’s formulation of federalism’s liberty preserving 
virtues is in tension with Kennedy and O’Connor’s attempt to conflate liberty 
with democratic accountability. But Kennedy and O’Connor would certainly 
agree with Justice Scalia that it is essential for states to retain their own 
power if they are to serve as a “counter” to the power of the federal 
government. Leaving state authority to the discretion of Congress effectively 
means no counterweight to federal authority. And federal authority, left 
unchecked, is a “menace” to freedom. 
 
 
 96. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2233. 
 97. But see id. at 2239 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
The ancient world understood the need to divide sovereign power among a nation’s citizens, 
thereby creating government in which all would exercise that power; and they called “free” the 
citizens who exercised that power so divided. Our Nation’s founders understood the same, for 
they wrote a Constitution that divided governmental authority, retained great power at state and 
local levels, and which foresaw, indeed assumed, democratic citizen participation in government 
at all levels, including levels that facilitated citizen participation closer to a citizen’s home. 
Id. 
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2. Dual Sovereignty and Federal Power 
A second consistent theme of the Court’s recent constitutional federalism 
decisions has been its insistence that the federal government is one of 
enumerated powers, a core premise of dual sovereignty. For example, Justice 
O’Connor asserts that: “every schoolchild learns [that] our Constitution 
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal 
Government. . . . [U]nder our federal system, the States possess sovereignty 
concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations 
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”98 For dual sovereignty to protect liberty, 
it is also necessary both that “[t]he Constitution created a Federal 
Government of limited powers”99 and that the Court continue to limit those 
powers. But the jurisprudence of the post-New Deal Court is founded on 
deference to Congress’s assertion of power over virtually all activity that 
takes place within the United States, no matter how remote its connection to 
any national interest.100 And with one minor exception,101 the Court has not 
departed from this deference in its constitutional federalism cases. 
This continued reliance on dual sovereignty has muddled the Court’s 
efforts to breathe life into the Tenth Amendment. Justice O’Connor, writing 
for the Court in New York , treated the Tenth Amendment question as one of 
dual sovereignty: “whether particular sovereign powers have been granted by 
the Constitution to the Federal Government or have been retained by the 
States.”102 The result is a rather strained insistence that the question of where 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause ends, and where the powers 
exclusively reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment begin, are 
“mirror images of each other.”103 Despite the transparency of the fiction, it is 
probably a necessary one in order to evade the force of the Court’s New Deal 
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment as stating “but a truism that all is 
 
 
 98. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism , 36 VA.  L. REV. 1 (1950) 
(chronicling the New Deal’s destruction of dual sovereignty). 
 101. See infra  text accompanying notes 107-113 (describing Lopez as a minor exception to the 
courts trend toward deference). 
 102. New York, 505 U.S. at 155. See also  H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of 
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 650 (1993) (“O’Connor’s federalism thus disavows the 
National League of Cities approach, which identified the federalism limit on congressional power as 
an analogue to Bill of Rights limitations, a trump that invalidates legislation that is within the scope of 
a power delegated to Congress.”). 
 103. New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (“If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the 
Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an 
attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the 
Constitution has not conferred on Congress.”) (citations omitted). 
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retained which has not been surrendered.”104 This line-drawing between state 
and federal power sits rather awkwardly with the Court’s repeated 
acquiescence in Congress’s appropriation of a general police power under the 
Commerce Clause. And the Court has not questioned the scope of that 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause in any of its Tenth Amendment 
cases.105 Nonetheless, the Court has found that state sovereignty limits 
congressional action in a number of other cases. For those who believe that 
constitutional limits should be grounded in the Constitution’s text, Justice 
Rehnquist was closer to the mark when he asserted that the Tenth 
Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, is an independent 
limit on Congress’s enumerated powers.106 The Court is more likely to 
develop a coherent constitutional federalism doctrine if it acknowledges that 
state sovereignty may trump otherwise valid exercises of federal power. 
B. The Court’s Decisions and Their Implications for Individual Liberty 
1. Limits on the Commerce Clause Power 
The Court’s long-standing deference to federal power made United States 
v. Lopez107 the most startling of the Court’s recent constitutional federalism 
cases. Lopez recognized limits, for the first time in half a century, on 
Congress’s ability “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”108 
The Court found that Congress had exceeded its authority by prohibiting 
 
 
 104. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124. 
 105. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 157. 
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the 
Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any government 
would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have believed that the 
Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers 
conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad 
enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role. 
Id. 
 106. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 553 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
In this case . . . the State is not simply asserting an absence of congressional legislative authority, 
but rather is asserting an affirmative constitutional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to be 
free from such congressionally asserted authority. Whether such a claim on the part of a State 
should prevail against congressional authority is quite a different question, but it is surely no 
answer to the claim to say that “a state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been 
authorized by Congress than can an individual.” 
Id. (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936)). 
 107. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. 
REV. 499, 517 (1995) (“From 1936 until April 26, 1995, the Supreme Court did not declare 
unconstitutional even one federal law as exceeding the scope of Congress’ powers under the 
Commerce Clause.”). 
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possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school. The Court’s concern for 
state sovereignty is clear: “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, 
we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid 
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States.”109 
Congress’s authority had to be limited in order to preserve an area, 
however small, of exclusive state authority, an essential premise of dual 
sovereignty. Lopez ensures that the Court can still plausibly claim that the 
national government is one of enumerated powers. And the decision may 
serve the salutary purpose of reminding Congress that it does not have 
unlimited power.110 Lopez does not, however, challenge the New Deal 
Court’s broad reading of the Commerce Clause.111 Indeed, it is not clear that 
Lopez puts any substantive limit on Congress’s power; it may simply require 
that Congress use a different form.112 
Lopez also does little to encourage the state regulatory competition that 
might promote freedom. The authority reserved exclusively to the states by 
Lopez is so narrow that virtually every state will exercise it to its full extent. 
Moreover, there will be little variation in that state regulation, as the holding 
in Lopez is unlikely to encourage states to allow students to bring guns to 
schools.113 Lopez is hardly a stimulus that will generate competition among 
the states on the appropriate regulation of guns. Thus, while Lopez was a 
surprising decision, it does little to enhances individual liberty. 
 
 
 109. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
 110. See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A 
Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism , 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1483 (1995) (“There is 
probably some relationship between the perception that there are no effective limits on Congress’ 
power, and Congress behaving as though its power is unlimited.”). 
 111. See Lopez,  514 U.S. at 556. New Deal cases  
ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously defined 
authority of Congress under that Clause. In part, this was a recognition of the great changes that 
had occurred in the way business was carried on in this country. Enterprises that had once been 
local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope. But the doctrinal change also 
reflected a view that earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially had constrained the authority of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 
Id. Of the Justices in the majority, only Justice Thomas was willing to say that the New Deal cases 
went too far in deferring to Congress’s assumption of a general police power. See id. at 599 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“If anything, the ‘wrong turn’ was the Court’s dramatic departure in the 1930’s from a 
century and a half of precedent.”). 
 112. The Court did not call into question its prior rulings upholding federal statutes regulating gun 
possession when the gun had traveled in interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 
(discussing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), which did not hold as unconstitutional a statute 
prohibiting felons from possessing guns that had traveled in interstate commerce). 
 113. See Lessig, supra note 43, at 209 (“Was there really a state that wanted to permit gun 
possession within 1,000 feet of a school, but which was disallowed by Congress’s statute?”). 
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2. The Clear Statement Rule 
The Court’s other constitutional federalism cases are likely to have a 
more significant impact on individual liberty, albeit indirectly. The first 
glimmer of constitutional federalism’s revival came before Lopez, in 
Gregory v. Ashcroft.114 At issue in Gregory was whether a provision of the 
Missouri constitution requiring judges to retire at age seventy was preempted 
by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).115 Justice 
O’Connor could not muster a majority to rethink whether the Court had 
achieved a “proper balance” between state and federal power; the absolute 
supremacy of the federal government went unquestioned.116 
Rather than limiting federal power by constitutional rule, Gregory 
announced a mode of statutory interpretation informed by federalism 
concerns. The Court would look for a “plain statement” of Congress’s 
intention to apply a law of general applicability to the states before it 
construes a statute as having that effect.117 While Justice O’Connor claimed 
that her mode of interpretation avoided a “potential constitutional 
problem,”118 it is difficult to see what that problem might be after Garcia, as 
the ADEA applies generally to both private and state employers.119 Congress 
retained the power to interfere with state sovereignty, as long as it made its 
intention plain. Further, the rule of interpretation did nothing to directly 
enhance individual liberty. It merely erected an obstacle to Congress’s 
interference with the states. 
Gregory’s plain statement rule works only indirectly to preserve liberty. It 
ensures that states will be put on notice to oppose draconian laws of general 
applicability that affect their operations so that Congress cannot sneak in 
regulation of the states through the back door. States will be alerted to the 
need to join private parties in lobbying against federal legislation, thus 
creating a more effective lobbying coalition of the sort anticipated by 
Hamilton.120 Similar plain statement rules apply to Congress’s imposition of 
conditions on federal grants to the states121 and to Congress’s abrogation of 
 
 
 114. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 115. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 116. See Gregory, 501 U.S. 452.  
 117. See id. at 460-64. 
 118. Id. at 464. 
 119. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (“The term ‘employer’ . . . also means a State. . ..”).  
 120. See supra  note 22 and accompanying text. See also  Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee 
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1988) 
(discussing the role of state and local governments in organizing opposition to federal policies). 
 121. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (“[I]f Congress desires to condition the 
States’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously . . . enabl[ing] the States to exercise their 
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states’ sovereign immunity.122 By eliminating ambiguity concerning the 
imposition of federal rules on state governments, these rules ensure that 
states will serve their liberty-enhancing role as focal points for lobbying 
against excessive federal regulation.123 At the same time, the clear statement 
rule allows the Court to maintain its deferential attitude toward Congress’s 
exercise of a general police power.124 
3. Commandeering 
Justice O’Connor found a majority for constitutional limits preserving 
state sovereignty the following term. In New York v. United States, the Court 
rejected Congress’s attempt to “commandeer” state legislatures by requiring 
them to adopt regulations to deal with nuclear waste produced within their 
boundaries.125 The Court looked to the early Republic’s transition from the 
Articles of Confederation to the Constitution to justify the anti-
commandeering principle.126 The Court concluded that the primary reason 
for the Articles’ failure was that they had the national government operating 
through the states, rather than directly governing individuals. The Framers 
repudiated that practice in favor of “a Constitution in which Congress would 
exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals rather than over 
 
 
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Pennhurst Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 122. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (stating that when 
“Congress unequivocally expresses this intention in the statutory language,” the court may determine 
that “Congress has abrogated the States’ [sovereign] immunity. . ..” 
 123. See Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court 
Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979, 1006 (1993) (“If extra consideration leads to a rejection of the 
application of a statute to the states, or if legislators shrink from approving of the statute simply 
because its application to the states becomes conspicuous, that rejection exemplifies the political 
protection of federalism values touted by Garcia .”); Rapaczynski, supra note 88, at 390.  
[T]he independence of the very process of state government, without seriously hampering the 
national authorities in regulating most private activities, assures the existence of an organizational 
framework, more efficient than any private institution could provide, that may always be used as 
an effective tool for bringing together otherwise defenseless individuals with some stake in 
resisting the overreaching of the national government. 
Id. See also  Grey, supra note 7 at 617-20 (discussing advantages and criticisms of clear statement 
rule). 
 124. See Bednar & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 110 at 1487 (“A clear statement approach rather than 
a constitutional approach to state burdens is also one with fewer political risks for the Court, because 
Congress can assert its preferences by overriding the Court with requisite clear statement (as it did in 
response to Agtascodezo )”). 
 125. See 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Justice O’Connor stated that “Congress may not simply 
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce 
a federal regulatory program.’” Id. at 161 (alterations in original) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
 126. See id . at 163-66. 
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States.”127 
The Court also offered two normative justifications for the anti-
commandeering rule. First, it justified its decision as enhancing 
accountability to the electorate. The Court contrasted a state’s decision to 
voluntarily participate in a federal program, for which state officials would 
remain accountable to their constituents, with state regulation compelled by 
the federal government. The Court worried that in the compelled case, “it 
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the 
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”128 The Court offered a 
second normative justification in the course of rejecting the notion that New 
York had acquiesced in the infringement on its sovereignty; the liberty-
enhancement rationale offered in Gregory. The Court suggested that 
allowing state officials to consent to federal infringement of their sovereignty 
could raise accountability problems at both the state and federal levels.129 
These arguments, however, would also apply to federal programs in which 
state governments were voluntary participants and such voluntary programs 
are clearly constitutional.130 Presumably, state politicians have brought the 
wrath of the electorate on themselves when they voluntarily participate in 
federal programs. 
The Court distinguished voluntary acceptance of federal standards by 
states. FERC, as well as Hodel, involved conditional preemptions under 
which Congress dictated to the states how they would regulate, but only if the 
states chose to regulate.131 In New York , by contrast, Congress was 
compelling New York to regulate private parties. This regulatory innovation 
went too far, as “the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon 
 
 
 127. Id. at 165. 
 128. Id. at 169. This accountability rationale has met with some criticism. See Caminker, supra 
note 88, at 1060-74. 
 129. New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83. 
[P]owerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the 
federal structure to be in their personal interests. . . . If a federal official is faced with the 
alternatives of choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer the 
latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. If a state official is faced with 
the same set of alternatives—choosing a location or having Congress direct the choice of a 
location—the state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance of personal 
responsibility. The interests of public official thus may not coincide with the Constitution’s 
intergovernmental allocation of authority. Where state officials purport to submit to the direction 
of Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly being advanced.  
Id. 
 130. See Hills, supra note 48, at 826 (“Such an argument seems to condemn not merely federal 
laws that commandeer state or local services but also even voluntary intergovernmental cooperation.”). 
 131. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161-62. 
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Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ 
instructions.”132 Congress had the power to preempt state regulation, or to 
regulate directly private parties producing nuclear waste, but it could not 
compel the states to regulate on behalf of the federal government.  
Conditions on federal grants were similarly distinguished as being 
voluntarily accepted by the states. The spending power conferred upon 
Congress the authority to direct state regulation by imposing conditions on its 
grants; the states were uncoerced because they were free to accept or reject 
the grants.133 Both conditional preemption and grants to the states were 
acceptable means of inducing state regulation; only direct coercion of the 
states’ exercise of sovereign authority was off limits. While Congress can 
prohibit states from taking certain actions, or bribe them to take actions they 
otherwise might not take, constitutional federalism prevents Congress from 
directing those actions.134 
The Court’s acceptance of conditional preemption reflects its general 
deference to the expansion of federal power. Preemption can be distinguished 
from commandeering by the amount of government regulation created. 
Congress’s power to regulate under the Commerce Clause is practically 
unlimited, so limiting its preemption power would leave two sets of laws on 
the books when Congress chooses to regulate.135 Rather than limiting 
Congress in this fashion, the Court has permitted Congress to preempt, in the 
interest of uniformity, even state laws whose purpose is consistent with 
federal regulation.136 Congress can establish a federal ceiling, as well as a 
federal baseline; it can free commerce, as well as obstruct it. Thus, 
preemption reduces the governmental burden imposed on citizens because 
they need only comply with one set of laws. Commandeering, by contrast, 
allows the federal government to regulate more because it does not bear the 
full cost of regulation. Commandeering may induce states to regulate less 
because of resource constraints, but that outcome is uncertain; states may 
 
 
 132. Id. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)). 
 133. See id . at 167. To be sure, this ignores the “race to the bottom” created by conditional 
spending as states compete for federal money by surrendering their sovereignty. See Yoo, supra note 
17, at 1401 (“If the fifty states are in competition for these funds, then the states that are most willing 
to surrender some of their autonomy will be the ones that acquire federal funds with the greatest. 
ease.”). 
 134. See Caminker, supra note 88, at 1009 (“None of these accepted strategies involves 
compulsion of affirmative state action, which seems more viscerally to treat states as subordinate 
agents of the federal government.”). 
 135. Two sets of laws will mean a greater burden. See Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 110, at 1463 
(“In our modern regulatory state, two layers of government seem as likely to impose double as to 
impose half the burdens that a single layer of government would impose.”). 
 136. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (holding that two 
Illinois acts were preempted by OSHA).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/5
p435 Pritchard.doc  4/23/01   4:02 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT 463 
 
 
 
 
simply levy a heavier tax burden on their citizens to fund their added 
responsibilities. Competition is unlikely to constrain this added tax burden 
because the federal government has imposed responsibilities on the states 
equally. 
Conditional preemption, on its face, is more difficult to justify than 
ordinary preemption. It allows the federal government to extend its reach by 
controlling state regulation. But the expanded federal power conditional 
preemption creates necessarily reduces the reach of state government. States 
are left to enforce federal standards rather than their own, but private parties 
need only comply with one set of standards. The state has demonstrated that 
it would regulate absent the federal regulation. Otherwise, the state would not 
bother to enforce the federal standards. Thus, conditional preemption merely 
exchanges a federal burden for a state one, thereby adding minimal 
governmental burden.137 Commandeering, on the other hand, may require the 
states to regulate in an area previously unregulated. This would create an 
additional governmental burden directed by the federal government at the 
states’ expense. This rationale may provide a more persuasive explanation 
for cases like FERC than the notion of state consent.138 If the states’ “choice” 
of whether to regulate seems illusory, it is because they believe that 
regulation is essential, and they would have regulated with or without the 
federal intervention. 
The New York  Court also distinguished prior decisions upholding the 
application of laws of general applicability to the states.139 The law at issue in 
New York ran afoul of constitutional federalism principles because it was 
directed at the states in their sovereign capacities. The Court stated this 
conclusion in terms remarkably similar to the argument that it had rejected in 
FERC: “The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause . . . 
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not 
authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate 
commerce.”140 The dissenters in New York  found the distinction between 
laws of general applicability and those directed specifically at the states 
unpersuasive. “An incursion on state sovereignty hardly seems more 
 
 
 137. To be sure, substituting a state regulation for a federal one eliminates the competition 
between states, but this is an inevitable by-product of federalization and the Court’s deference to 
federal power. 
 138. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 965-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The state commissions could avoid 
[the obligation to consider federal standards] only by ceasing regulation in the field, a ‘choice’ that we 
recognized was realistically foreclosed, since Congress had put forward no alternative regulatory 
scheme to govern this very important area.”). 
 139. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160. 
 140. Id. at 166. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p435 Pritchard.doc  4/23/01   4:02 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
464 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:435 
 
 
 
 
constitutionally acceptable if the federal statute that ‘commands’ specific 
action also applies to private parties. The alleged diminution in state 
authority over its own affairs is not any less because the federal mandate 
restricts the activities of private parties.”141  
But allowing Congress to regulate state operations cannot easily be 
carved out of federal power to regulate the economy generally. One of the 
rationales justifying the regulation of intrastate commerce is that it is “an 
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless intrastate activity were 
regulated.”142 An analogous rationale justifies imposing rules of general 
applicability on the states. As the court pointed out in Fry v. United States143 
in upholding a federal law freezing wages as applied to state employees,  
[i]n 1971, when the freeze was activated, state and local governmental 
employees composed 14% of the Nation’s work force. It seems 
inescapable that the effectiveness of federal action would have been 
drastically impaired if wage increases to this sizeable group of 
employees were left outside the reach of these emergency federal 
wage controls.144 
Regulation of state economic activity may be essential to ensure the 
effectiveness of regulation generally when the states are major participants in 
the regulated area. 
The distinction between laws of general applicability and those directed 
specifically at the states nonetheless can be justified as preserving individual 
liberty. As Judge Easterbrook has recognized,  
[s]o long as public market participants are treated the same as private 
ones, they enjoy the protection the latter have been able to secure from 
the legislature; and as Congress is not about to destroy private industry 
(think what that would do to the tax base!) it can not hobble the states 
either.145 
 
 
 141. Id. at 201-02 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Printz, 521 U.S. 
at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A structural problem that vanishes when the statute affects private 
individuals as well as public officials is not much of a structural problem.”); Matthew D. Adler & Seth 
F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 
110-15 (criticizing distinction between laws of general applicability and laws directed toward the 
states). 
 142. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 143. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).  
 144. Fry 421 U.S. at 548 (1975) (citation omitted). 
 145. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Jackson, supra note 3, at 2207. 
[W]hen a state is subject to a statute that applies to many private entities, states are protected in at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/5
p435 Pritchard.doc  4/23/01   4:02 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT 465 
 
 
 
 
The converse is also true. States’ opposition to laws of general applicability 
will help protect private industry from overreaching by the national 
government. By contrast, “[a] state-specific law does not provide states with 
the protection that private groups have arranged for themselves; it could in 
principle be a vehicle of destruction.”146 
Judge Easterbrook took a wrong step, however, when he allowed the 
existence of similar restrictions in other laws to qualify a law directed solely 
at the states as being one of general applicability. Private parties who are 
already subject to federal restrictions are unlikely to resist when Congress 
proposes analogous restrictions on the states.147 Timing matters; by 
legislating in a piecemeal fashion, Congress can adopt a strategy of divide 
and conquer.148 
Despite this risk, the Court held that the requirements imposed by 
Congress on state motor vehicle departments in the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act149 were constitutional.150 Chief Justice Rehnquist brushed 
aside South Carolina’s argument that the law was not one of general 
applicability, observing that it “regulates the universe of entities that 
participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information—the 
States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and 
private resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce.”151 If such 
derivative application suffices to make a law one of general applicability, we 
can expect Congress to exploit this loophole to draft legislation targeting the 
states under a pretense of general applicability. 
 
 
least two ways. First, such a statute—to the extent that it is directed at some significant amount of 
private activity—is unlikely to be aimed at uniquely governmental functions of states; states 
would not be “singled out” for the purpose of federal use of their governmental capacities. 
Second, statutes that fall on private and public interests may be more likely to be closely 
politically monitored and contested; the legislative process is ‘safeguarded’ from imprudent 
decisions not only by the states’ representation but also by the general public’s representation. 
Id. 
 146. Travis,  163 F.3d at 1005.  
 147. See Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 1410. 
Proposals targeted only at [states and localities] leave them isolated in the legislative process, 
bereft of allies to help reduce the legislative zone of discretion. In contrast, when the legislature 
considers proposals affecting [states and localities] in the same fashion as other persons . . . , the 
localities have partners in the lawmaking process, obviating the need for special care of [local] 
interests.  
Id. 
 148. To be sure, the Court approved a separate law imposing a tax on state-issued bearer bonds in 
South Carolina v. Baker, but a separate regime was necessary because of the tax free status of state 
bonds, not enjoyed by corporate issuers. 485 U.S. at 527. 
 149. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725. 
 150. Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000). 
 151. Id. at 672. 
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While Congress should ordinarily be required to regulate states in the 
same manner as private entities, some states functions may have no private 
analogue. A law that regulates the states separately from private employers 
could still pass constitutional muster, but only if Congress imposes the same 
rule on the federal government. By requiring Congress to restrict itself we 
can be confident that Congress is not using the law to undermine the 
sovereignty of the states. If the law applies to both federal and state 
government, the states have not been singled out.152 
Printz v. United States brought a second application of the anti-
commandeering principle.153 The Printz Court struck down a federal statute 
that required state law enforcement officers to check the background of 
prospective handgun purchasers. The anti-commandeering rule of New York  
was extended to prohibit the federal government from enlisting state 
executive branch officials for federal regulatory purposes. The Court insisted 
that “[i]t is an essential attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they 
remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of 
authority.”154 Congress could not implement its policy choices by enlisting 
state officials as federal bureaucrats. Notably, the Court did not rest its 
conclusion solely on the Tenth Amendment, but also invoked “reasonable 
implications” from other constitutional provisions, suggesting a broader 
scope for the protection of state sovereignty.155 
Justice Stevens, in dissent, challenged the majority’s contention that the 
anti-commandeering rule protects liberty: 
 Perversely, the majority’s rule seems more likely to damage than to 
preserve the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of 
vital state governments. By limiting the ability of the Federal 
Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its 
 
 
 152. Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism , 1997 SUP. CT. 
REV. 199, 246. 
Although Justice Scalia surely recognizes that generally applicable laws can impose the same type 
of burden on state executives as state-targeted commandeering statutes, his focus . . . on the 
“whole object of the law” suggests that only laws that particularly target state executives violate 
the “very principle of separate state sovereignty” he has constructed. On this view, the states’ 
sovereign status provides them with a right not to be singled out by Congress on the basis of their 
statehood, and nothing more. 
Id. 
 153. 521 U.S. 898. 
 154. Id. at 928. 
 155. Id. at 924 n.13 (“Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitut ional 
provisions and not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly. It is not at 
all unusual for our resolution of a significant constitutional question to rest upon reasonable 
implications.”). 
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programs, the Court creates incentives for the National Government to 
aggrandize itself. In the name of States’ rights, the majority would 
have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to 
implement its policies.156 
Justice Stevens confuses size with aggrandizement, and thus, his fear of a 
gigantic federal bureaucracy arising from the anti-commandeering principle 
seems overblown. The federal government’s interference with private choice 
does not vary with reliance on federal or state bureaucrats; the only 
difference is which level of government pays. The budget constraint is the 
only limit that Congress seems to take seriously. Massive deficits and the 
discipline imposed by the international market for debt are the only structural 
tools that have been shown to limit Congress’s thirst to expand the size and 
scope of the federal government. 
Apart from liberty concerns, it is difficult to see how the anti-
commandeering rule could impair government effectiveness. Making 
Congress pay for state services does not seem like a huge burden to place on 
the federal government.157 If Congress doesn’t like the price charged by the 
states for regulating private conduct, it can hire its own administrators.158 
And if Congress is unwilling to pay this price, it suggests that the policy’s 
benefits may not exceed its costs.159  
Justice Souter suggests that Congress should be allowed to commandeer, 
but be required to pay compensation ex post.160 This suggestion makes little 
sense given that Congress can bargain with the states. The barriers to a 
transaction that would suggest the need for a taking power, such as potential 
holdout problems, can be overcome by the usual logrolling that facilitates 
 
 
 156. Id. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 157. See id . at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Congress is . . . free to amend the interim program 
to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as it does with a 
number of other federal programs.”). 
 158. See Hills, supra  note 48, at 893-900 (arguing that federal commandeering of state resources 
is inefficient).  
 159. But see Caminker, supra note 88, at 1084. 
Requiring Congress to establish local federal machinery would, at a minimum, drive up the cost of 
the federal program and make Congress divert federal resources from other projects or raise 
federal taxes, yet it would bring no compensating social gain. In more extreme cases, the 
requirement might make the program prohibitively expensive or administratively infeasible, in 
which case the federal goal remains unrealized. . . . [A]t least when the total implementation cost 
is relatively low . . . unfunded mandates are reasonable, since federal reimbursement would itself 
entail potentially substantial transaction costs which represent deadweight social losses.  
Id. 
 160. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 975-76 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I do not read any of The Federalist 
material as requiring the conclusion that Congress could require administrative support without an 
obligation to pay fair value for it.”) 
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most legislation.161 The more substantial objection is that withholding money 
under federal programs, which the Court allows, can be just as coercive as 
commandeering or subjecting states to suit.162 But that objection fails in the 
absence of any limits on the federal spending power.163 
4. Sovereign Immunity 
The final piece of the Court’s revived constitutional federalism has been a 
resuscitation of sovereign immunity. The Court has repeatedly rebuffed 
congressional attempts to use its Article I powers to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages.164 The Court also rejected 
the proposition that a state’s involvement in a commercial activity regulated 
by Congress could be construed as a waiver of its sovereign immunity.165 
Finally, in Alden v. Maine the Court held that Congress could not abrogate 
the states’ sovereign immunity in the states’ own courts.166  
The Court’s strong defense of sovereign immunity can be reconciled with 
a freedom-enhancing vision of constitutional federalism. Freeing the states 
from paying damages reduces Congress’s ability to enlist private individuals 
to help impose its policies on the states. This is another application of the 
budget constraint as a means of preventing federal aggrandizement.167 If 
 
 
 161. See Hills, supra  note 48, at 934-38 (criticizing Souter’s theory). The ability of the federal 
government to solicit voluntary st ate cooperation also seems sufficient answer to the criticism that the 
anti-commandeering rule precludes federal use of state officials in an emergency. See, e.g, Jackson, 
supra note 3, at 2212. 
Although reasonable minds may disagree whether the Brady Act was responding to an 
emergency, as the dissent points out, emergencies on occasion do arise—in the event of sudden 
war, for example, [Printz] would preclude the mandatory use of state officials to administer a draft 
law, or in the event of a hazardous waste emergency, to compel the involvement of state officers 
in response. 
Id. In the case of a genuine emergency, it is hard to imagine that state officials would refuse their 
cooperation. And the concept of “emergency” is sufficiently flexible that we should be hesitant before 
giving Congress the power to commandeer state officials upon invoking an emergency. 
 162. See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; 119 S. Ct. at 2236 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Given the 
amount of money at stake, it may be harder, not easier, for a State to refuse highway funds than to 
refrain from entering the investment services business.”). 
 163. See supra notes 107-113 and accompanying text. 
 164. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627; College Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 666; 119 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 165. See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; 119 S. Ct. at 2224-31. This case suggests that 
Congress’s power of conditional preemption has at least one limit: Congress cannot force the states to 
waive their sovereign immunity from damages. Sovereign immunity may be a special case, or it may 
suggest that the current Court is open to rethinking the broad conditional preemption power that it 
recognized in Hodel and FERC. Thanks to Evan Caminker for this point. 
 166. Alden, 527 U.S. 706; 119 S. Ct. 2240. Alden is discussed below at infra notes 212-220 and 
accompanying text. 
 167. The Court also seemed skeptical that Congress was imposing a rule on state government that 
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Congress wants to control the states, it has to pay the price for attorneys at 
the Department of Justice to bring suit.168 Allowing a plethora of “private 
attorneys general” to enforce rules against the states would permit off-budget 
expansion of federal government power over the states in the same manner as 
commandeering.169 Making Congress pay the full price of enforcement 
requires cost internalization; Congress will impose fewer policies on the 
states if it has to pay the full cost of administering those policies via the court 
system.170 To be sure, freeing states from paying damages may undermine 
the purposes of regulation by putting private competitors of the states at a 
competitive disadvantage,171 but this result enhances individual liberty as the 
disadvantaged businesses will lobby Congress for relief. And any 
undermining of deterrence is likely to be minimal, given that suits against 
localities and individual government officers remain available.172 Thus, 
“Congress has ample means to ensure compliance with valid federal laws, 
but it must respect the sovereignty of the States.”173 State sovereign 
immunity encourages the states to serve as a counterweight to federal power. 
 
 
it had declined to impose on the federal government. See Alden, at 2264 (“It is unquestioned that the 
Federal Government retains its own immunity from suit not only in state tribunals but also in its own 
courts.”). Would Alden have come out differently if the United States had waived its immunity from 
suit? A less expansive protection of sovereign immunity would allow Congress to impose rules on 
state governments only if it had imposed them on the federal government as well. This would greatly 
discourage rules being imposed on the states. However, this would come at a cost of removing the 
states as focal points for lobbying on behalf of the private sector. 
 168. See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; 119 S. Ct. at 2240 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress . 
. . might create a federal damages-collecting ‘enforcement’ bureaucracy charged with responsibilities 
that Congress would prefer to place in the hands of States or private citizens.”). Cf. Alden, 527 U.S. 
706, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (“despite specific statutory authorization [under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)], the 
United States apparently found the same interests insufficient to justify sending even a single attorney 
to Maine to prosecute this litigation.”). 
 169. See Frank B. Cross, Realism about Federalism , 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1323 (1999) 
(arguing that the Court’s recent sovereign immunity decisions “could be seen as mere stalking horses 
for an antiregulatory ideological conservative agenda” or “as part of a conservative antitort plaintiff 
agenda”). 
 170. See Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (“Suits brought by the United States itself require 
the exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent 
from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.”). 
 171. See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. at 2235 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
[A] Congress that includes the State not only within its substantive regulatory rules but also 
(expressly) within a related system of private remedies likely believes that a remedial exemption 
would similarly threaten that program. It thereby avoids an enforcement gap which, when allied 
with the pressure of a competitive marketplace, could place the State’s regulated private 
competitors at a significant disadvantage. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 172. See Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (“sovereign immunity . . . bars suits against 
States but not lesser entities”). And those suits will still attract plaintiffs’ attorneys because sovereign 
immunity will not bar the payment of attorneys’ fees by those entities and individuals.  
 173. Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. at 2268. 
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In sum, the Court has used its revived constitutional federalism sparingly. 
The Court by and large has not challenged directly the scope of federal 
power. It instead has protected the role of the states as bulwarks against 
federal overreaching by placing narrow constraints on the federal 
government’s power over the states. Those constraints, taken together, 
encourage the states to act as focal points against the expansion of federal 
power and prevent the federal government from using the state governments 
as an off-budget resource. Rather than abandoning the protection of state 
sovereignty to the political process, the Court has used constitutional 
federalism to ensure that the states will have the incentives and resources to 
play an active role in the political process. This result harnesses the states in 
the effort to preserve individual liberty. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AND STATE COURTS 
This Part is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the 
Court’s decisions discussing Congress’s power to control state courts. The 
second section looks at the “judicial exception” to the anti-commandeering 
principle announced in New York  and Printz, and the limits to that exception 
announced in Alden. 
A. Congress’s Power over State Courts 
State courts have not been immune from Congress’s expansion of power. 
Congress has the same authority to preempt substantive law imposed by state 
courts as it does state legislation.174 And Congress has the power to preempt 
state tort claims,175 even if it leaves an injured party without a remedy.176 But 
Congress’s control over state court procedures is less clear. The early 
doctrine of dual sovereignty led to strong statements, albeit in dicta, that 
Congress lacked the power to control state court adjudication: 
 There are within the territorial limits of each State two 
governments, restricted in their spheres of action, but independent of 
 
 
 174. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963) (“The authority of Congress is no less when 
the state power which it displaces would otherwise have been exercised by the state judiciary rather 
than by the state legislature.”).  
 175. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318-19 (1981) 
(finding that state common law may be preempted by federal law); Grey, supra note 7, at 607 (“There 
is no question that the federal government has the power under the Commerce Clause to preempt state 
tort claims.”). 
 176. See Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) (finding no 
constitutional requirement that federal laws preempting state causes of action “either duplicate the 
recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy”). 
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each other, and supreme within their respective spheres. Each has its 
separate departments; each has its distinct laws, and each has its own 
tribunals for their enforcement. Neither government can intrude within 
the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein by its judicial 
officers with the action of the other.177 
The conclusion that states are supreme in determining state court 
procedures has been repeated more recently. In 1997, the Court stated that 
“[w]e have made it quite clear that it is a matter for each State to decide how 
to structure its judicial system.”178 
Despite the Court’s “clear” position, these statements cannot be taken at 
face value. The Court has afforded Congress broad authority to dictate when 
state courts will have jurisdiction over federal claims. State courts have 
jurisdiction over federal causes of action unless Congress has provided for 
exclusive federal jurisdiction.179 This conferral of jurisdiction on state courts 
is mandatory, rather than permissive.180 State courts are required to treat 
federal law as part of the law of the state.181 Not only can Congress require 
that state courts hear federal claims, Congress can also dictate that state 
courts can hear some questions raised by a federal law, while prohibiting 
 
 
 177. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406 (1871). See also  id. at 407-08. 
Such being the distinct and independent character of the two governments, within their respective 
spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the 
other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National government to 
preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority. In their laws, and mode of 
enforcement, neither is responsible to the other. How their respective laws shall be enacted; how 
they shall be carried into execution; and in what tribunals, or by what officers; and how much 
discretion, or whether any at all shall be vested in their officers, are matters subject to their own 
control, and in the regulation of which neither can interfere with the other. 
Id. 
 178. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922 n.13 (1997). See also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 
138 (1988) (“No one disputes the general and unassailable proposition. . . that States may establish the 
rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts.”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 466-67 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
For this Court to go beyond the adequacy of the state ground and to review and determine the 
correctness of that ground on its merits would . . . be to assume full control over a State’s 
procedures for the administration of its own criminal justice. This is and must be beyond our 
power if the federal system is to exist in substance as well as form. The right of the State to 
regulate its own procedures governing the conduct of litigants in its courts, and its interest in 
supervision of those procedures, stand on the same constitutional plane as its right and interest in 
framing ‘substantive’ laws governing other aspects of the conduct of those within its borders. 
Id. 
 179. See Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 521 (1898). 
 180. See McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934) (“[T]he 
Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general jurisdiction from refusing to [enforce FELA] 
solely because the suit is brought under a federal law.”). 
 181. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (“the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing 
policy in every state.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p435 Pritchard.doc  4/23/01   4:02 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
472 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:435 
 
 
 
 
others. Under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,182 Congress 
authorized the law’s administrator to bring enforcement actions in either 
federal or state court. But challenges to the Price Control Act could only be 
brought in a special federal court established by the law.183 The Court 
rejected a constitutional challenge to this arrangement, holding that “the 
authority of Congress to withhold all jurisdiction from the state courts 
obviously includes the power to restrict the occasions when that jurisdiction 
may be invoked.”184 Thus, Congress can selectively deny state courts 
jurisdiction over federal questions.185 In sum, Congress clearly has broad 
power to dictate when state courts will decide federal causes of action.186 
More relevant to the question raised by the Uniform Act are cases holding 
that Congress can limit the jurisdiction of state courts to hear state law causes 
of action. Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act187 withdraws “the power 
of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the 
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”188 The Court has held 
that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to adopt this 
prohibition on state court jurisdiction over both federal and state law claims, 
as long as the transaction involves interstate commerce.189 Thus, the 
Commerce Clause grants authority to Congress to preclude state courts from 
adjudicating state law actions, at least when those actions affect interstate 
commerce. 
Congress is not limited to merely restricting state court jurisdiction; it can 
also impose affirmative obligations on state courts when they adjudicate 
federal claims. State courts generally can apply state procedural rules; they 
are not bound to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when 
adjudicating federal causes of action.190 But state courts cannot apply rules of 
 
 
 182. 56 Stat. 23, repealed by Price Control Extension Act of 1946, ch.671, § 1, 60 Stat. 663, 664.  
 183. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1944). 
 184. Id. at 512. 
 185. The reverse is not true; a state cannot limit the ability of a federal court to hear a case arising 
out of state law within the jurisdiction of the federal court. Thus, states cannot control the adjudication 
of state law causes of action by controlling the forum. See Railway Co. v. Whitton’s Administrator, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 286 (1871) (stating that a case “cannot be withdrawn from the cognizance of the 
federal court by any provision of state legislation that it shall only be enforced in a state court”). 
 186. For a review of the historical support for Congress’s ability to dictate that state courts hear 
federal claims, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism , 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 
2007-32 (1993). Prakash argues that the Continental Congress also exercised this power under the 
Articles of Confederation. See id. at 1967-1971 (chronicling Congress’s use of state courts to hear 
federal claims under the Articles). 
 187. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
 188. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 189. See id. at 11. See also  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) 
(declining to overrule Southland). 
 190. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918-19 (1997). 
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local procedure if they would “impose unnecessary burdens on rights of 
recovery authorized by federal laws,”191 even if the rules are facially non-
discriminatory.192 “[T]he Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a 
constitutional duty ‘to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights 
of the parties under controlling federal law are protected.’”193 The 
requirement that state courts not apply procedures that would defeat federal 
claims is not peculiar to courts, of course; it reflects a general  
duty owed to the National Government, on the part of all state 
officials, to enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such fashion as 
not to obstruct the operation of federal law, and the attendant reality 
that all state actions constituting such obstruction, even legislative 
acts, are ipso facto invalid.194 
This obligation to not obstruct federal law flows directly from the first part of 
the Supremacy Clause.195 
Congress’s power to control state courts has its limits. State courts of 
limited jurisdiction are not required to hear federal causes of action if they 
would not hear an equivalent state law cause of action.196 Limitations on 
jurisdiction presumably do not run foul of the rule against defeating federal 
claims because some court of general jurisdiction would be available to hear 
the claim. But what if Congress stated its purpose that a federal claim be 
heard in “any court”? It would seem then that the state’s decision to limit 
jurisdiction would defeat the stated federal goal. Which rule prevails? The 
Court has not been called on to resolve this tension, although it has suggested 
in dicta that such a directive might exceed Congress’s power.197 
 
 
 191. Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949) (holding that local rule 
requiring particularized pleading could not be applied to a federal claim). 
 192. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1952) (holding 
that the validity of a release of a federal claim must be tried before a jury, even though state procedure 
allocated such questions to judges); Felder, 487 U.S. at 140-41 (1988) (holding that state could not 
impose “notice of claim” provision on federal claim against state officials). 
 193. Felder, 487 U.S. at 151 (quoting Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 
(1942)). 
 194. Printz, 521 U.S. at 913 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) 
 195. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”). 
 196. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120-21, 123 (1945). 
 197. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (“The requirement that a state court of 
competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a 
requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is 
presented.”). See also  Hart, Jr., supra  note 13, at 507 (arguing that the state court must exercise 
jurisdiction in such a case, but reserving judgment on the question of whether the states must provide 
courts to hear federal claims); Redish & Sklaver, supra  note 14, at 105 (“Because the existence of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p435 Pritchard.doc  4/23/01   4:02 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
474 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:435 
 
 
 
 
B. The Judicial Exception to the Anti-Commandeering Rule 
Congress’s ability to force state courts to apply federal law sits uneasily 
with the anti-commandeering principle of New York  and Printz.198 The 
Court’s constitutional federalism decisions establish that Congress has three 
mechanisms by which it can control the states: “as a condition of federal 
spending, in order to avoid the threat of unilateral federal action in the area, 
or as a part of a program that affects States and private parties alike.”199 The 
congressional command to enforce federal law does not seem to fit into any 
of these three categories, as Congress does not provide general funding for 
state courts; mandating jurisdiction is not an alternative to federal 
jurisdiction; and finally, the requirement is directed specifically at state 
courts. Does this mean that Congress is “commandeering” state courts when 
it charges them with the enforcement of federal law? 
The Court’s answer has been “Yes,” but such commandeering of state 
courts nonetheless is permitted by the Constitution. The New York Court 
introduced the “judicial exception” to the anti-commandeering principle. The 
Court found a textual basis for distinguishing cases involving “the well 
established power of Congress to pass laws enforceable in state courts”200 in 
the “Supremacy Clause’s provision that federal law ‘shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.’”201 The Court also found a structural difference in the 
practice because it involved: 
congressional regulation of individuals, not congressional 
requirements that States regulate. Federal statutes enforceable in state 
courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort 
of federal “direction” of state judges is mandated by the text of the 
Supremacy Clause. No comparable constitutional provision authorizes 
Congress to command state legislatures to legislate.202 
 
 
commandeering power reflects the principle of federal dominance within the structure of judicial 
federalism, state courts should not be given wide-ranging and effectively unreviewable discretion to 
ignore federal procedures that might prove to be important to attaining and preserving federal 
substantive goals.”). 
 198. See Hills, Jr., supra  note 48, at 933 (“[T]he notion that Rhode Island is somehow impeding 
the federal government because it wishes to use its own courts for its own claims seems strained. . . . 
An antidiscrimination norm that is defined so expansively might be viewed as contradicting the 
argument . . . that the federal government should pay for the services that it receives.”). 
 199. Printz, 521 U.S. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 160, 167 (1992)).  
 200. New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (citing Testa v. Keit, 330 U.S. 389, 402 (1973)).  
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 178-79. 
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The Court’s textualist and structuralist arguments can be supported on a 
functional basis. Congress can direct judges because such commands cannot 
be separated from its power over individuals. Judges, state or federal, will 
inevitably encounter federal rights and obligations in the course of resolving 
disputes. Such federal rights and obligations will be undermined if state 
courts are not bound by federal law, regardless of whether or not state courts 
were required to hear federal causes of action. If state courts were free to 
ignore federal commands, it would undermine Congress’s unquestioned 
authority to regulate private conduct under the Supremacy Clause. Thus, the 
“judicial exception” to the anti-commandeering rule announced in New York  
is essential to Congress’s broad authority to regulate, the cornerstone of the 
Court’s post-New Deal jurisprudence. 
In Printz, the Court elaborated further on the “judicial exception” to the 
anti-commandeering rule. Confronted with a plethora of laws enacted by 
early Congresses imposing duties on state judges, the Court responded that 
“[t]hese early laws establish . . . that the Constitution was originally 
understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce 
federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters 
appropriate for the judicial power.”203 The Court identified structural, textual 
and functional bases for this differential treatment of state courts. The 
structural basis was Article III’s provision making the establishment of lower 
federal courts discretionary with Congress. State courts obviously would 
have been necessary to hear federal claims if Congress had foregone the 
creation of lower federal courts.204 The textual basis was the last part of the 
Supremacy Clause, which mandates that “the Judges in every State shall be 
bound” by federal law.205 Finally, the functional basis was intrinsic in the 
judicial role: 
[U]nlike legislatures and executives, [courts] applied the law of other 
 
 
 203. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907. 
 204. See id . (“Article III, § 1, established only a Supreme Court, and made the creation of lower 
federal courts optional with the Congress—even though it was obvious that the Supreme Court alone 
could not hear all federal cases throughout the United States.”). 
 205. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2). See also id. at 928-29 (“Testa stands for the 
proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law—a conclusion mandated by the terms 
of the Supremacy Clause (‘the Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law]’)”). Justice 
Stevens,  in dissent, charged that the majority had misread the significance of this language because the 
majority ignored the clause that comes after it—“any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.” Id. at 968 n.21 (Stevens,  J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, 
“[t]he omitted language . . . makes clear that the specific reference to judges was designed to do 
nothing more than state a choice of law principle.” Id. See also  Caminker, supra note 88, at 1034-42 
(criticizing the Court’s textual distinction of judges from other state actors); Redish & Sklaver, supra 
note 14, at 82-90 (same). 
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sovereigns all the time. The principle underlying so-called ‘transitory’ 
causes of action was that laws which operated elsewhere created 
obligations in justice that courts of the forum state would enforce. The 
Constitution itself, in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, generally 
required such enforcement with respect to obligations arising in other 
States.206 
Courts exist to resolve disputes. Implicit in that role is the requirement 
that judges interpret and enforce the law, from whatever source it may 
come207 and that function requires judges to follow commands issued by 
others, including federal commands. Therefore, being commandeered is 
inherent in being a judge, whether state or federal. 
The Printz Court confirms this interpretation of the judicial exception. 
Printz cabined FERC as falling within the judicial exception to the anti-
commandeering rule. The Court characterized it as a case that “required state 
administrative agencies to apply federal law while acting in a judicial 
capacity.”208 States are free to transfer adjudicative functions from a court to 
an agency, but that transfer does not free state adjudication from “the power 
of Congress to prescribe . . . that those adjudications must take account of 
federal law.”209 The Court opined that “FERC would not have been decided 
the way it was if nonadjudicative responsibilities of the state agency were at 
issue.”210 Administrative agencies, like courts, must follow federal 
commands in adjudicating disputes. 
In Alden v. Maine211 the Court went beyond the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment to recognize a more general principle of state sovereign 
immunity, rejecting Congress’s efforts to force the states to defend suits for 
damages in their own courts.212 Alden suggests that commandeering may 
apply to state courts in at least some form, despite the judicial exception 
 
 
 206. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (citations omitted). 
 207. See Caminker, supra note 88, at 1050 (“[I]t has traditionally been understood that part of a 
court’s normal business is entertaining claims arising under the laws of foreign sovereigns when 
necessary to resolving disputes between parties within its territorial jurisdiction. For example, it is 
quite common for American courts (state or federal) to apply the laws of other American states or of 
foreign countries to parties properly before them.”). 
 208. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-71 (1982)). See also 
Baker, 485 U.S. at 514 (1988) (construing FERC as holding that “Congress had the power to require 
that state adjudicative bodies adjudicate federal issues and to require that States regulating in a pre-
emptible field consider suggested federal standards and follow federally mandated procedures.”) 
(citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-67). 
 209. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929 n.14. 
 210. Id. 
 211. 527 U.S. 706; 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).  
 212. See id . at 2246. 
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identified in New York  and Printz. The Court recognized two constitutional 
principles that preserve state sovereignty. First, the Constitution reserves to 
the states “a substantial portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together 
with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status,” i.e., dual 
sovereignty. “Second, even as to matters within the competence of the 
National Government, the constitutional design secures the founding 
generation’s rejection of ‘the concept of a central government that would act 
upon and through the States’ in favor of ‘a system in which the State and 
Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people,” 
i.e., the anti-commandeering principle.213 
Both principles were at stake in Alden, and for the first time the Court 
found that the federal government had commandeered a state court: “A 
power to press a State’s own courts into federal service to coerce the other 
branches of the State . . . is the power first to turn the State against itself and 
ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State against 
its will and at the behest of individuals.”214 Perhaps the Court was simply 
using the language of commandeering loosely in this context, not really 
intending to place its sovereign immunity holdings within its constitutional 
federalism doctrine. But if the Court meant more by this reference, we are 
confronted with several possible interpretations of this statement. Perhaps the 
use of state courts constitutes the prohibited commandeering. This seems 
unlikely because it would conflict with Congress’s general power to enlist 
the state courts in enforcing federal law. The statement could also be 
interpreted as the use of state courts against the state itself as being 
commandeering. But the state legislature can be required to legislate to make 
the state’s behavior conform to federal law; even laws of general 
applicability may require a state to adopt legislation to conform to federal 
law.215 Legislation, of course, is simply one of the means by which states 
control their own behavior, or more accurately, the behavior of their agents 
through whom they act.216 Requiring the state to use its own courts to make 
its behavior conform to federal law hardly seems more objectionable than 
requiring legislation. 
 
 
 213. Id. at 2247 (citations omitted). 
 214. Id. at 2264. 
 215. For example, a federal minimum wage law might require the state legislature to adopt a new 
wage scale for civil servants.  
 216. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15 (rejecting a claim that requiring registration of state-issued 
bonds qualified as commandeering: “Such ‘commandeering’ is, however, an inevitable consequence of 
regulating a state activity. Any federal regulation demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage 
in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal 
standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect.”). 
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The significance of the statement is further undercut by the Court’s 
reliance on Article III’s delineation of “the judicial power” to determine the 
limits of Congress’s ability to force jurisdiction on the state courts.217 The 
Court stated that there “was no constitutional precept that would admit of a 
congressional power to require state courts to entertain federal suits which 
are not within the judicial power of the United States and could not be heard 
in federal courts.”218 Congress could not be understood to have more power 
over state courts than it had over federal courts. This suggests that Congress 
can use the state courts against the state if the United States brings the suit 
itself because the United States would have the authority under Article III to 
bring the suit in federal court. Having excluded these other explanations, we 
are left with the invocation of state court jurisdiction against the state by a 
private individual seeking money damages as the violation of the 
commandeering principle as it applies to state courts. 
This is a significant departure for the commandeering doctrine. Under 
New York and Printz, it was the national government’s use of state actors to 
govern the conduct of private individuals that violated the anti-
commandeering rule. Under Alden, it is the national government’s attempt to 
authorize private individuals to use state courts to govern the state’s conduct 
that is impermissible. 
It is the principle of sovereign immunity that is important here, not the use 
of state courts. The Court does not want Congress to use its power over state 
courts to evade sovereign immunity. The budget constraint principle 
reconciles the seemingly disparate rules of New York  and Printz, on the one 
hand, and Alden, on the other. Commandeering of state legislators and 
executive branch officials is impermissible because it allows the federal 
government to regulate on the state’s nickel. The result is more government 
— and thus more interference with individual liberty — than if the federal 
government were forced to bear the full costs of regulation. Allowing private 
actors to seek damages from the states in state courts also allows the federal 
government to regulate at the state’s expense. Absent sovereign immunity, 
the state would be paying plaintiffs and their attorneys for the privilege of 
having federal law enforced against itself.219 The Alden Court pointedly 
noted that the “the United States apparently found the [federal interest in 
 
 
 217. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 218. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266. 
 219. See id. at 2264 (“an unlimited congressional power to authorize suits in state court to levy 
upon the treasuries of the States for compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and even punitive 
damages could create staggering burdens, giving Congress a power and a leverage over the States that 
is not contemplated by our constitutional design.”). 
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compensating the States’ employees] insufficient to justify sending even a 
single attorney to Maine to prosecute this litigation.”220 
And the rules that would be enforced are likely to be liberty-reducing, 
even though they are being enforced against the states rather than private 
individuals. The statute at issue in Alden, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938 (“FLSA”), is a good example.221 The FLSA limits the ability of 
employers and employees to negotiate over the terms of employment, 
including hours and wages.222 It represents an attempt by Congress to protect 
rents extracted by unionized labor, a powerful interest group. Insofar as 
sovereign immunity limits enforcement of the FLSA, individual liberty is 
enhanced, as employees and employers have a greater range of contractual 
options. But the constraint is a limited one, as Congress continues to have 
other enforcement options to encourage states to conform to the law.223 
In this regard, it is well to remember that the principles of federalism that 
constrain Congress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause power have less force 
when Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.224 
Such greater congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment is 
consistent with a libertarian view of federalism, as the Civil War 
amendments were adopted to allow the federal government to stop the states’ 
egregious infringements on the liberty of newly-freed slaves. The Civil War 
amendments establish a special area where the national government can 
control state conduct to preserve liberty.225 
Even here, however, Congress’s power has its limits,226 a necessity if 
Congress is to be prevented from aggrandizing itself under the aegis of 
liberty protection.227 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents represents the 
 
 
 220. Id. at 2269. 
 221. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 222. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207.  
 223. Of course, federal law can still be enforced through suits by the United St ates, or suits 
brought against state officers seeking injunctive relief.  
 224. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (“reaffirm[ing] that when properly 
exercising its power under § 5 [of the 14th Amendment] Congress is not limited by the same Tenth 
Amendment constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its commerce clause powers”). The Civil 
War amendments “were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on 
state sovereignty.” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.  156, 179 (1980). See also Adler & 
Kreimer, supra  note 35, at 119-26 (arguing that Congress has fewer state autonomy concerns when it 
legislates pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 225. The Supreme Court, in addition to Congress, has an important role to play in this regard. See 
Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 
753-54 (detailing control over state court procedures under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 226. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act as beyond Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5). 
 227. The Court has restricted itself in this regard by placing limits on habeas review of state court 
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Court’s most recent effort to draw this line.228 In Kimel, the Court rejected 
Congress’s efforts to make the states answerable for money damages under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).229 Because the Equal 
Protection Clause was not intended to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
age, requiring the states to pay damages for violating the ADEA was beyond 
Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.230 
In this context, the Court’s sovereign immunity doctrine is a blunt tool for 
protecting individual liberty. Statutes such as the ADEA, barring 
discrimination on some disfavored basis, arguably restrict the freedom of 
private employers in selecting their employees, a reduction in liberty from 
the employers’ perspective.231 But the states as employers have no liberty 
interest worth recognizing. Anti-discrimination laws in that context provide a 
benefit to the favored class without a corresponding reduction in liberty for 
the disfavored class because the states — as legal constructs — cannot enjoy 
liberty the way that individuals do. States are tools for the organization of 
society and the protection of rights. They are not ends in themselves as 
humans are. Sovereign immunity may discourage Congress from imposing 
severe monetary penalties on private employers for discrimination because 
the states will not have to answer in damages. This potential enhancement of 
individual liberty seems rather tenuous, however, in light of the discretion 
that it may give to the states to engage in arbitrary conduct that serves no 
one’s liberty interest. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM 
STANDARDS ACT 
This Part explains Congress’s motives in adopting the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act and why it adopted the form of preemption 
that it did.232 It then assesses the provisions of the Act for consistency with 
principles of constitutional federalism. I conclude that the Supreme Court is 
 
 
convictions. See Bednar & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 110, at 1464 (“If a libertarian, ‘double security’ 
theory were taken seriously, the Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence would have to be rethought, for 
example. Under the banner of ‘our federalism,’ the Court for twenty years has been curtailing the 
availability of federal courts to second-guess state court deprivations of individual liberty.”). 
 228. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000). 
 229. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 230. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 643-640. 
 231. To be sure, this reduction in liberty may be justified, as long as it is narrowly tailored to 
restrict choices made on such arbitrary bases as race. 
 232. The description of the Uniform Act here is drawn in part from David M. Levine & Adam C. 
Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue 
Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1 (1998). 
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likely to uphold the Uniform Act. This result is consistent with the 
constrained libertarianism vision of constitutional federalism because the 
burdens that the Uniform Act places on state courts do not detract from, and 
in fact may enhance, individual liberty. 
A. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
The Uniform Act was adopted to remedy certain problems that had arisen 
in the implementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995.233 The Reform Act significantly rewrote the rules governing private 
federal securitie s fraud lawsuits. The Reform Act raised the bar at several 
points in the litigation process, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring 
these actions.234 The provisions relevant to the subsequent adoption of the 
Uniform Act are as follows: 
1. Heightened pleading standards: Plaintiffs must plead facts giving rise 
to a “strong inference” that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind for fraud. In addition, if pleading on information and belief, plaintiffs 
are required to state all facts underlying those beliefs.235 
2. Stay of discovery: Plaintiffs have no access to discovery while a motion 
to dismiss is pending. As a practical matter, the discovery stay ensures that 
every complaint will be met by a motion to dismiss and plaintiffs can no 
longer use discovery to frame an adequate complaint.236 
3. Safe harbor for forward-looking information: Unrealized material 
forecasts are not subject to liability if the forecast was accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary language, or the forecast was not knowingly false 
when made.237 
These reforms, directed largely at securities fraud class actions brought in 
federal court, left state securities fraud actions untouched.238 Class action 
lawyers sought to avoid the restrictions imposed by the Reform Act by filing 
state law actions in state court. The migration to state court, (particularly in 
California) led companies (particularly high-technology firms located in 
Silicon Valley) to Washington seeking further legislation restricting such 
 
 
 233. See id . at 1-2. 
 234. See id . at  2.  
 235. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1),(2) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 236. 15 U.S.C. § 780-4(b)(3)(B). 
 237. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5. 
 238. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud 
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 287 (1998) (“Congress seems to have viewed litigation 
reform as a federal problem that required a federal solution.”). 
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suits.239 The shift of securities fraud litigation to state court, they argued, 
would undermine the effectiveness of the Reform Act.240 
One answer to the problem of migration to state court would have been to 
impose the Reform Act’s requirements on actions in state court. This 
wholesale intervention into state court procedures likely would have been 
held unconstitutional. While Congress clearly has the power to eliminate 
liability under state law for statements protected by the Reform Act’s safe 
harbor, it is less clear that Congress would have the power to dictate when a 
state court judge must stay discovery in a state law cause of action, or to 
mandate the pleading standard that a judge should apply in assessing the 
sufficiency of a state law complaint. Alden’s holding—that Congress cannot 
require state courts to do what it could not direct federal courts to do under 
Article III—might be read as implicitly authorizing the converse: Congress 
can impose requirements on state courts if it could impose similar 
requirements on federal courts. And Congress’s power to impose procedural 
requirements on federal courts adjudicating state actions is unassailable. But 
this probably reads too much into Alden’s reliance on Article III. The Court 
has stated on numerous occasions, albeit in dicta, that the federal government 
lacks the power to control state court procedures in adjudicating state law 
causes of action.241 Imposing the Reform Act’s stay of discovery and 
pleading standards on state courts adjudicating state law causes of action 
would clearly violate that principle, if that principle reflects a rule that binds 
Congress. The dilemma is created by the fact that the Court has never 
identified a constitutional basis for this principle. 
The anti-commandeering rule may shed light on this question. Requiring 
a stay of discovery and heightened pleading standards would arguably fall 
within the scope of the anti-commandeering rule because state courts would 
be forced to regulate the litigation behavior of private parties at Congress’s 
behest. Imposing such a requirement on state courts would go beyond the 
creation of federal rights and duties affecting primary conduct. If Congress 
wants to control securities fraud class actions, it can require that they be 
brought in federal court under federal law. Alternatively, the judicial 
exception to the anti-commandeering principle would allow Congress to 
preempt state fraud law entirely, but allow parties to bring their federal 
claims in state court. If Congress did this, the stay of discovery and 
 
 
 239. See Leslie Eaton, The Silicon Valley Gang; An Influential Industry With Lots of Money Is 
Getting Its Way on Capitol Hill, N.Y. T IMES, June 11, 1998, at D1.  
 240. See Perino, supra  note 238, at 315-18 (discussing implications of the rise in state securities 
class actions to the implementation of the Reform Act). 
 241. See supra  notes 177-178 and accompanying text. 
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heightened pleading standards might be considered essential parts of the 
federal claim and thus appropriate for Congress to require that state courts 
follow these procedures in adjudicating the federal claim. The judicial 
exception to the anti-commandeering rule allows Congress to force state 
courts to enforce federal law because it is essential to protect the rights and 
obligations of individuals created by federal law. But it is difficult to 
characterize pleading standards and discovery, unaccompanied by a federal 
claim, as substantive rights or obligations. They are tools that courts use to 
manage litigation that determines substantive rights and obligations. 
Therefore, extending the Reform Act to state courts might have constituted a 
form of impermissible commandeering. 
B. Preemption of State Fraud Class Actions for Nationally-Traded 
Securities 
Rather than face these constitutional obstacles, Congress instead deprived 
state courts of the power to adjudicate certain securities fraud class actions. 
The Uniform Act preempts suits: 
based upon the statutory or common law of a State or subdivision 
thereof . . . by any private party alleging– 
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or 
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
covered security.242 
The breadth of the preemption has an important limitation: it reaches only 
“covered securities.”243 This definition relies on provisions added to the 
Securities Act by the National Securities Market Improvement Act 
(“NSMIA”).244 The Securities Act preempts state registration requirements 
for “nationally traded securities,” which are defined as securities “listed, or 
authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) or the 
American Stock Exchange (“AMEX”), or listed on the National Market 
 
 
 242. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-352, § 101(a)(1), 112 
Stat. 3227. While the language is not identical, the Uniform Act has essentially the same broad reach 
as the general federal anti-fraud prohibition found in the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act, 
the typical basis for federal class actions. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999). 
 243. Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 101(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3227. 
 244. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) 
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System of the Nasdaq Stock Market” (“Nasdaq/NMS”) or “a security of the 
same issuer that is equal in seniority or that is a senior security” of the same 
issuer who has a security listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq\NMS.245 
The Uniform Act adds preemption of state anti-fraud class actions to 
NSMIA’s preemption of state registration requirements. Therefore, if the 
issuer has any securities listed on a national trading market, all of its 
securities equal or senior to that listed security are exempt from state anti-
fraud class actions. Only issuers whose securities are not listed on national 
markets, primarily micro-cap and penny stock issuers, remain subject to state 
actions. This may be appropriate, as states have traditionally played an 
important role in combating fraud in these markets.246 Thus, Congress is only 
preempting actions relating to securities that are being traded in interstate 
commerce.247 Congress clearly has this power of preemption. The existence 
of national trading markets provides a sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce,248 and Congress has the authority to “prohibit all—and not just 
inconsistent–state regulation.”249 
C. Intrusions into State Court Procedures 
The principal constitutional issue raised by the Uniform Act is the second 
limitation imposed on the scope of preemption. Preemption does not apply to 
all state fraud suits, but only to “class actions” raising fraud claims. The 
Uniform Act relies on a unique definition of “class action” that does not 
mirror the definition found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Instead, 
the Act provides several overlapping definitions of actions involving multiple 
parties. “Class actions” are defined broadly to include: 
 
 
 245. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1) (Supp. II 1996). 
 246. See Perino, supra  note 238, at 331. 
 There is a strong case for maintaining state authority over causes of action involving smaller 
securities offerings, such as penny stock offerings, investment contracts, limited partnership 
programs, and blank-check offerings. These sorts of offerings often target unsophisticated 
investors and have been at the heart of many securities fraud scams. States have traditionally 
regulated these types of offerings and act as a sort of “cop on the beat” to help enforce antifraud 
rules. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 247. See id . at  321 (“[N]ational securities markets pay no heed to state boundaries: Whether 
buyers are located in New York, California, Montana, Connecticut, or elsewhere makes no difference 
to disclosure rules, price discovery mechanisms, or trading practices that govern transactions in 
national markets.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (holding 
that courts must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, 
if the finding has any rational basis). 
 249. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981). 
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 (i) any single lawsuit in which– 
  (I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or 
prospective class members, and questions of law or fact common 
to those persons or members of the prospective class, without 
reference to issues of individualized reliance on an alleged 
misstatement or omission, predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual persons or members; or 
  (II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a 
representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed 
parties similarly situated, and questions of law or fact common to 
those persons or members of the prospective class predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual persons or members; 
or 
 (ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and 
involving common questions of law or fact, in which– 
  (I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and 
  (II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed 
as a single action for any purpose.250 
Subsection (ii) governs the typical securities fraud class action. It 
preempts cases where damages are sought by one or more named parties on 
behalf of themselves and as a representative of other unnamed parties. 
The Uniform Act leaves an important set of fraud actions untouched. For 
example, if a broker or investment adviser defrauds thirty-five of her clients, 
that action could still be brought collectively under state law. And any 
individual who has been defrauded can bring an action under state law. 
Congress did not want to deprive individuals of their state law remedies 
when, for example, a small business owner sells overpriced stock in his 
company to his brother–in–law. Face–to–face transactions such as this are 
the bread and butter of state fraud law, and the only thing to be gained from a 
uniform federal standard is more work for federal courts. No interest group 
would be willing to pay for the federalization of such disputes.251 Limiting 
 
 
 250. Securities Act § 16(f)(2)(A) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998)). 
 251. See Macey, supra note 5, at 267 (“Congress will delegate to local regulators only when the 
political support it obtains from deferring to the states is greater than the political support it obtains 
from regulating itself.”). Indeed, Congress may pay a political price for complete preemption. See 
Hills, Jr., supra  note 48, at 868. 
With conditional preemption, Congress is constrained by its limited regulatory capacity. Congress 
cannot obtain the condition unless it can make a credible threat of preemption. but preemption is 
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preemption to class actions therefore reduces the intrusion into state 
regulatory authority in what would seem to be predominantly a state law 
concern, that of face-to-face transactions within one state. 
Despite this concern for preserving state regulatory authority over 
primarily local transactions, limiting the Uniform Act’s preemption to class 
actions raises a complicated constitutional question: can Congress dictate 
how state courts form adjudicate state law causes of action? The Court’s 
decisions applying the Federal Arbitration Act to bar state courts adjudicating 
certain state law actions suggest that Congress can prevent state courts from 
deciding certain state law actions if there is a connection to interstate 
commerce.252 But here Congress has restricted state court actions, based not 
on the substance of state law, but rather the procedure employed by the state 
court. This would seem to conflict with the Court’s dicta stating that the 
federal government lacks the power to control state court procedures in 
adjudicating state law causes of action.253 That dicta would suggest that the 
Uniform Act’s prohibition of class actions is beyond Congress’s authority.254 
But the Court has never stated the constitutional basis for this limitation on 
congressional power. Perhaps the Court assumed that control of state 
procedures was beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power when it first 
made these statements, and continues to repeat them now, despite its 
abandonment of any serious limits on Congress’s enumerated powers. If so, 
the Court might abandon the rule when confronted with the question.255 
The Court’s constitutional federalism doctrine can help answer this 
question. The Uniform Act cannot be defended as a law of general 
applicability because state courts have an effective monopoly on the 
adjudication of these preempted claims. Private parties are not in the business 
of deciding state fraud class actions. Nor can it be defended on a conditional 
spending ground: Congress has not funded the states’ court systems in 
exchange for fraud adjudication services. 
 
 
politically costly. Especially where federal regulators are inexperienced in some field, they might 
not be capable of replacing state law with equally popular federal laws. Federal inexperience 
might turn any federally implemented regulatory scheme into a political liability for Congress. 
Id. 
 252. See supra  notes 187-189 and accompanying text.  
 253. See supra  notes 177-178 and accompanying text. 
 254. Congress would have the authority to prevent violations of the Due Process Clause under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but it is difficult to see the class action device as a due process violation. See 
Parmet, supra note 14, at 30 (“[B]ecause there is no Fourteenth Amendment right to a prohibition of 
joined claims, class actions or consolidated actions, it would be difficult to justify [preclusion of class 
actions] as authorized by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 255. But see Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1083 (1993) (questioning 
whether litigation in state court can be deemed “commerce”). 
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On the other hand, eliminating state court class actions does not fit neatly 
in the commandeering category. Following the New York  and Printz 
analyses, Congress has not directed the state courts to regulate anyone; it has 
simply barred state courts from regulating in a certain way. In this sense, the 
Uniform Act looks like simple preemption. Alternatively, the Uniform Act 
could be thought of as a form of conditional preemption. If the states choose 
to regulate securities fraud, they must do so in a certain way, through 
individual actions. On this view, straightforward application of FERC 
justifies the intrusion into state court procedures as falling within Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority and not running afoul of the commandeering 
rule. As Justice Harlan put it:  
The right of the State to regulate its own procedures governing the 
conduct of litigants in its courts, and its interest in supervision of those 
procedures, stand on the same constitutional plane as its right and 
interest in framing ‘substantive’ laws governing other aspects of the 
conduct of those within its borders.256 
Therefore, if procedure “stands on the same constitutional plane” as 
substantive law, Congress can apply its power of conditional preemption to 
state courts. 
Nor would the Alden version of commandeering, allowing a private party 
to use a state entity against the state, be implicated by the Act.257 State courts 
are hearing disputes only between private parties, and Congress is not even 
forcing the courts to do that. Moreover, Congress has provided an alternative 
regulatory scheme in the federal securities laws with a range of 
compensatory remedies if states choose not to regulate, so it is difficult to see 
any element of coercion. 
This analysis is consistent with the normative justification underlying the 
Court’s constitutional federalism decisions identified by this Article.258 The 
form of preemption chosen by Congress is liberty enhancing. The Uniform 
Act eliminates a portion of state regulation that threatens to interfere with the 
federal regulatory scheme. It therefore leaves individuals with only one set of 
regulations with which they must comply, rather than two.259 It also preempts 
 
 
 256. Fay, 372 U.S. at 466-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 257. See supra  notes 212-220 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra  notes 78-104 and accompanying text. 
 259. Elimination of duplicative regulation is the traditional justificat ion offered by proponents of 
securities law preemption. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 
471, 494 (1993) (“From the securities industry’s perspective, blue sky law has offered only 
duplicative, nonuniform regulation and endless demands for paper and fees.”); Brian J. Fahrney, 
Comment, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for Federal Pre-Emption Due to Increasing 
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an area of state law that corporate issuers cannot easily evade by their choice 
of state of incorporation.260 And because of the risk that states will try to 
extract rents from foreign corporations through lax liability standards, 
efficiency is arguably enhanced as well.261 Congress has narrowed state 
regulatory authority in an area where federal authority is unquestioned. 
Unfortunately for state politicians, this wide discretion given to Congress in 
preempting state legislation means that non-preempted areas most likely will 
be ones in which there are few rents to extract or administrative burdens are 
likely to be great, e.g., adjudicating hundreds of ordinary business disputes as 
securities fraud actions. Notwithstanding this curtailment of state regulatory 
authority, the “constrained libertarianism” theory of constitutional federalism 
cases supports the constitutionality of the Uniform Act. 
D. The Discovery Stay 
Preempting class actions, but not individual actions, creates an obvious 
loophole around the Reform Act’s discovery stay provision. Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers would still be free to bring a federal class action and a parallel state 
action on behalf of an individual who would otherwise be a member of the 
class. Discovery obtained in the individual action could then be used to 
bolster the complaint in the class action. 
In seeking a more effective solution to the discovery stay problem, a 
conundrum arises. The obvious solution would be to preempt all securities 
 
 
Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 753, 757-58 (1992) (“In many cases, the 
state and federal regulatory bodies impose overlapping requirements, causing needless, wasteful 
duplication for issuers.”). 
 260. See Perino, supra  note 238, at 325. 
The structure of the securities fraud market essentially precludes mobility for publicly held 
companies whose securities trade on national markets. Unlike the corporate charter market, the 
securities fraud market has nothing equivalent to the corporate internal affairs doctrine, which 
preserves mobility by giving corporations the ability to opt in to one state’s regulatory scheme 
simply by reincorporating there. 
Id. 
 261. See Michael G. Dailey, Comment, Preemption of State Court Class Action Claims for 
Securities Fraud: Should Federal Law Trump?, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 606 (1999) (discussing 
availability of negligent misrepresentation claim under state law); Perino, supra  note 238, at 327. 
Negative spillover effects can be a significant problem in the market for securities fraud causes of 
action because most shareholders of a given publicly traded company will not reside in the 
jurisdiction. In-state plaintiffs will benefit from more lax liability rules while the costs of such 
rules, e.g., a higher cost of capital, are largely exported out-of-state. Under these conditions, states 
have incentives to create plaintiff-favorable laws that may permit excessive securities litigation, 
one of Congress’ primary concerns when it enacted the Reform Act. 
Id. 
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actions, not just class actions.262 Such a course would have removed all 
constitutional difficulties, as Congress clearly has the power to exclude states 
from regulating the national securities markets. As discussed above, 
however, preempting all state securities actions comes at a cost. Investors 
defrauded in local transactions would be precluded from suing in state court 
under state law, even though the state interest would likely outweigh the 
federal interest in such cases. Thus, complete preemption would have posed a 
substantial threat to state regulatory authority, as well as imposing a 
substantial burden on federal courts. In any event, even preemption of all 
actions probably would not have stopped circumvention of the federal 
discovery stay. Plaintiffs would still be left with certain options, including 
state court derivative actions and state inspection statutes, unless Congress 
preempted corporate law as well.263 
Rather than preempt all state fraud actions, Congress gave federal courts 
control over discovery in the remaining securities cases that Congress has not 
reserved to the federal courts. The Uniform Act provides: 
Circumvention of stay of discovery 
Upon a proper showing, a court may stay discovery proceedings in 
any private action in a State court as necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action 
subject to a stay of discovery pursuant to this subsection.264 
Congress’s preservation of the states’ regulatory authority over some 
cases required an alternative incursion into the state courts’ control over their 
dockets. As written, the stay gives federal judges broad discretion in staying 
state discovery; it literally applies to “any private action” of any description. 
The language “as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 
effectuate its judgments” tracks that found in the Anti-Injunction Act;265 
courts are likely to look there for guidance. If they do, they should be 
unlikely to enjoin state discovery based on an anticipated, but unfiled federal 
action.266 The language of the provision reinforces the conclusion that a 
 
 
 262. The first bill introduced would have preempted all private state anti-fraud actions, but it 
quickly fell by the wayside. See H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 263. See Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes for Discovery 
in Federal Securities Fraud Actions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69, 84 (1997). 
 264. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 265. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to 
stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where 
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments”). 
 266. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that “the 
district court was obliged to ascertain, at least in a preliminary fashion, its own subject matter 
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federal action must already be filed, as it is limited to “an action subject to a 
stay of discovery.”267 Allowing the federal courts to enjoin state court 
proceedings when no federal action had been filed would raise serious 
constitutional issues.268 If the discovery stay provision is interpreted 
consistently with the Anti-Injunction Act, it is unlikely to provoke 
constitutional difficulties. The interference with state court procedures would 
be limited to what was needed to ensure that federal court litigation 
proceeded as Congress intended, a straightforward application of the 
Supremacy Clause. 
E. Removal to Federal Court 
One more provision of the Uniform Act interferes with state court 
adjudication of fraud actions. Subsection (c) allows the defendant to remove 
covered class actions to federal court.269 The provision is unusual, in that it 
allows actions to be removed to federal court even though they are 
preempted by the Uniform Act. That is, it allows for removal of actions so 
that they can be dismissed in federal court. Ordinarily, one would expect the 
law to require the defendant to bring its motion to dismiss or demurrer in 
state court. Indeed, the Uniform Act appears to strip the state court of subject 
matter jurisdiction and the court should therefore dismiss the case on its own 
motion. 
The removal provision, however, serves two important federal interests: 
(1) it allows federal courts to interpret the scope of preemption, thus 
enhancing uniformity; and (2) it triggers the Reform Act’s stay of discovery. 
Some state court rules allow discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending, 
thus forcing the defendant to seek a discretionary stay from the state court, or 
an injunction against discovery from a federal court under the Uniform 
 
 
jurisdiction . . . before issuing an injunction in aid of that jurisdiction.”). 
 267. The first case to construe this provision inexplicably declined to apply it to an individual state 
court securities action. In re Transcrypt Int’l Sec. Litig., 57 F.Supp.2d 836 (D. Neb. 1999). This 
decision is inconsistent with the text of the statute (“any private action”) and negates the primary 
purpose of the provision.  
 268. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engr’s, 398 U.S. 281, 287 
(1970) (stating that the Anti-Injunction Act’s “statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part 
rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts”). Resolving the 
question on statutory grounds, the Court had no occasion to specify what limits that “fundamental 
constitutional independence” placed on Congress. Id. 
 269. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (Supp. IV 1998) (“Any covered class action brought in any State court 
involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this section, shall be removable to the 
Federal district court for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to subsection 
(b) of this section.”). 
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Act.270 Removal allows the defendant to file a motion to dismiss based on the 
Uniform Act in federal court. The motion to dismiss automatically triggers 
the federal discovery stay under the Reform Act.271 Thus, removal allows 
Congress to protect issuers against the costs of “fishing expedition” 
discovery without further interference with state courts. 
The removal provision does not raise any substantia l constitutional 
difficulties. The Uniform Act creates a federal defense to a state law cause of 
action, and the removal provision allows a federal court to hear that federal 
question. This practice is well established.272 
F. Limits on the Scope of Preemption 
The remaining provisions of the Uniform Act raise no constitutional 
federalism issues, but they do show that Congress took into account the 
balance between the federal and state governments in drafting the law. The 
preemption of the Uniform Act is limited in important ways that protect state 
regulatory authority and financial interests. 
1. Protection of State Corporate Law 
The original bills that eventually became the Uniform Act would have 
had the unintended effect of preempting a substantial body of state corporate 
law. The Supreme Court has zealously guarded the distinction between state 
corporate law and federal securities law,273 while Congress and the SEC have 
generally respected this distinction. In addition, the internal affairs doctrine 
ensures that a corporation will not face diverse state regulation, and more 
importantly, that the regulation will be no more intrusive than the managers 
 
 
 270. The injunction against discovery may or may not be available, depending on whether a 
parallel action has been filed.  
 271. If a non-preempted action has been removed erroneously to federal court, subsection (d)(4) 
allows the federal court to remand the action to state court. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4). 
 272. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 264 (1879). 
A case consists of the right of one party as well as the other, and may truly be said to arise under 
the Constitution or a law or a treaty of the United States whenever its correct decision depends 
upon the construction of either. Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow 
out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the right or privilege, or claim or 
protection, or defence [sic] of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted. “When a 
question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the Constitution forms an 
ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction 
of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.” 
Id. (quoting Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). 
 273. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (“[W]e are reluctant to federalize the 
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transacting in securities, particularly 
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p435 Pritchard.doc  4/23/01   4:02 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
492 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:435 
 
 
 
 
of the corporation think appropriate. Because managers and shareholders can 
choose which state corporate law will apply for the company, by choosing 
the state of incorporation, substantial freedom of contract is ensured. 
In order to preserve the role of state corporate law, the overall definition 
of class action was revised to explicitly exclude “an exclusively derivative 
action brought by one or more shareholders on behalf of a corporation.”274 
Derivative actions, of course, are the only enforcement vehicle available for 
fiduciary duties owed to the corporation, essential to corporate governance, 
and traditionally the province of state courts. 
Other corporate law duties, however, required a more carefully tailored 
carve out. Under state corporate law, issuers and their officers and directors 
generally owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure to their shareholders.275 That 
duty of disclosure requires the issuer and its managers to speak truthfully to 
its shareholders.276 Even though the corporate law duty of disclosure 
significantly overlaps with the coverage of federal securities law, actions 
based on corporate duty of disclosure are generally interwoven with other 
corporate law claims. Claims based on the breach of this duty typically arise 
out of mergers, tender offers and other extraordinary corporate transactions, 
when the board is asking shareholders to take certain actions. These claims 
are individual, rather than derivative, because they affect the shareholder’s 
decision involving his individual shares, even though it may have an effect 
on the corporation as a whole. These claims are routinely litigated in state 
courts, most notably the Delaware Chancery Court. The Chancery Court has 
developed expertise in this area that the federal courts are unlikely to match. 
In addition, the Delaware courts can resolve these claims within days rather 
than months, an important consideration if a merger is pending. 
A limitation, tagged the “Delaware carve out,” was adopted in order to 
preserve these advantages of state law. This effort had widespread support, 
including that of corporate issuers, who were interested in maintaining the 
predictability offered by Delaware corporate law.277 The carve out contains 
two prongs. Subsection (i) preserves state jurisdiction for breach of fiduciary 
duty claims arising from transactions taking place between the issuer and its 
security holders, while subsection (ii) preserves state jurisdiction for breach 
 
 
 274. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 275. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, 
Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
1087 (1996); Nicole M. Kim, Note, Malone v. Brincat: The Fiduciary Disclosure Duty of Corporate 
Directors Under Delaware Law,  74 WASH . L. REV. 1151 (1999). 
 276. See id .  
 277. See Rachel Witmer, SEC, Private Bar Working to Address Flaw in Litigation Reform Bills, 
30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 169, 170 (Jan. 30, 1998). 
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of fiduciary duty claims arising from an issuer’s recommendation, position, 
or other communication concerning mergers and other extraordinary 
corporate transactions.278 The carve out is limited to actions “based upon the 
statutory or common law of the State in which the issuer is incorporated . . . 
or organized.”279 This limitation gives the issuer control over its litigation 
exposure because it can choose its state of incorporation. It is therefore 
consistent both with maintaining state regulatory authority and the freedom 
of managers and shareholders to choose their regulatory regime. And 
whatever one thinks of the balance that state corporate law strikes between 
managers and shareholders, federalizing this area of law is unlikely to 
improve the situation for shareholders.280 
2. Protecting State Financial Interests 
In addition to preserving state regulatory authority, Congress protected 
state financial interests with the final limitation on the scope of preemption. 
The preemption of state class actions is a law of general applicability that can 
be imposed on the states as well as individuals. Nonetheless, a separate carve 
out was made for state governments and pension funds to use state law to 
 
 
 278. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1). The Delaware carve out creates at least one unavoidable problem: 
it re-opens the “reverse auction” for class action settlements. The “reverse auction” problem was 
created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 
(1996). In that case, the Supreme Court held that a state court class action settlement, which released 
both state law claims and federal securities claims pending in a parallel federal suit, had a preclusive 
effect on the federal claims. The state court judgment precluded the federal claims notwithstanding the 
federal court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities claims under Section 27 of the 
Exchange Act. Matsushita  raises the possibility that defendants will be able to minimize their liability 
exposure through a “reverse auction,” offering to settle claims against them with the plaintiffs’ 
attorney who offers the lowest bid. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the 
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370-72 (1995). This result obviously threatens the 
interests of the plaintiff class, which could have its claims sold out on the cheap.  
 The Uniform Act reduces the potential for a “reverse auction.” By eliminating parallel state 
securities class actions, the Uniform Act lessens the chances for a collusive settlement between 
defendants and a faithless plaintiffs’ attorney. However, the Uniform Act does not eliminate the 
potential for a “reverse action.” The result of the Delaware carve out, and the exclusion for derivative 
claims, is that there will still be some parallel state actions where federal securities claims can be 
settled, even though they cannot be litigated on the merits in state court because of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. Thus, the Matsushita  reverse auction problem persists in that  category of cases. 
Defendants will still be able to run “reverse auctions” when state cases have been filed, pitting state 
court plaintiffs against federal court plaintiffs. This may explain the willingness of corporate issuers to 
preserve state corporate law claims. Allowing corporate law claims may reduce the settlement value of 
securities law claims. In this case, more may be less; more potential fora could lead to less liability 
exposure. 
 279. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 280. The effect of state competition to provide corporate charters has been disputed. See supra 
note 85. 
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protect their own financial interests. Under this carve out, state entities are 
allowed to bring class actions under state law.281 The provision saves actions 
by state entities from the grouping provision in the definition of class action. 
Even without this provision, state entities were free to sue in state court 
where they would only count as one investor for purposes of the preemption 
threshold. With the amendment, state entities may not be grouped with any 
other plaintiff (state entity or not) for purposes of counting to fifty. In 
practice, the amendment is unlikely to be invoked with any frequency, as 
most state entities will find it cheaper to participate in a broader-based federal 
class action. Only when state law confers substantial advantages will it make 
sense for state entities to bear the expense of bringing their own class action. 
Notwithstanding the unlikelihood of this provision being invoked, it does 
demonstrate Congress’s concern that the states have the means to protect 
their financial integrity. The provision is evidence supporting the claim of the 
Garcia court that the states were capable of securing exemptions from laws 
of general applicability in Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s recent constitutional federalism decisions place some modest 
constraints on the growth of federal power. I have argued in this article that 
those constraints encourage states to serve as focal points against federal 
incursions into individual liberty. Applying this analysis to the Uniform Act 
suggests that the Act does not run afoul of principles of constitutional 
federalism. 
Some may view the promotion of individual liberty to be misguided.282 
Others may view these constraints as being so modest as to be trivial.283 It is 
 
 
 281. The Uniform Act provides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, nothing in this section may be construed to 
preclude a State or political subdivision thereof or a State pension plan from bringing an action 
involving a covered security on its own behalf, or as a member of a class comprised solely of 
other States, political subdivisions, or State pension plans that are named plaintiffs, and that have 
authorized participation, in such action. 
15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 282. See Bednar & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 110, at 1490 (“Overall, the Court’s recent decisions 
have a decidedly libertarian slant reminiscent of the Lochner-era bias that was repudiated by the New 
Deal.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 108, at 501 (“Hindsight reveals that federalism has been primarily a 
conservative argument used to resist progressive federal efforts, especially in the areas of civil rights 
and social welfare.”); Adler & Kreimer, supra note 141 (criticizing the Court’s distinction between 
preemption and commandeering: “We doubt that state action, at least state action within this zone, is 
more likely to produce significant harm to the interests or welfare of the citizenry, or of some portion 
thereof, than state action.”). 
 283. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 169, at 1304 (arguing that “federalism does not now and will 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/5
p435 Pritchard.doc  4/23/01   4:02 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT 495 
 
 
 
 
too soon to assess the efficacy of the Court’s revived constitutional 
federalism doctrine in promoting liberty. The states have, on occasion, served 
as bulwarks against federal overreaching.284 If the point of the new 
constitutional federalism is to harness the states as allies of individual liberty, 
its effectiveness can only be assessed over time as regulatory battles are 
fought out in Congress. But it does seem fair to say that the new 
constitutional federalism is unlikely to bring about a wholesale revision of 
the welfare state brought by the New Deal.285 
For a revival of restraint on the federal government, we are likely to see 
more progress from competition than from the Constitution. International 
trade and global capital markets impose a far more substantial discipline on 
Congress than does the Supreme Court.286 This new order of world-wide free 
trade holds the promise of recreating the freedom-protecting competition that 
the United States enjoyed under its original “dual sovereignty” version of 
federalism.287 If individuals and businesses have a choice among jurisdictions 
when making an investment, jurisdictions have a powerful incentive to make 
themselves attractive to such investment.288 Government fears this trend, of 
 
 
never have authentic legal significance as a principled constraint on the power of the national 
government.”); Caminker, supra note 88, at 1088. 
Just beneath the surface of the Court’s opinions in New York, Gregory, and other recent federalism 
cases, lurks a discernible and genuine lament about the tremendous expansion of congressional 
power since the Constitution’s Founding, coupled with an apparent frustration over what to do 
about it. The Court’s anti-commandeering rule appears borne of this frustration, best understood 
as a symbolic gesture–waving the banner of state sovereignty whether victory was here deserved 
or not. 
Id. 
 284. See SHAPIRO , supra  note 85 (citing the role of states in opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts 
and the Fugitive Slave Laws and as early champions of individual rights). But see id. at 52 (“[T]he 
states do not appear to have served as a bulwark of individual and group rights and interests.”). See 
also Friedman, supra note 26, at 403 (“It was the states first called for balanced budgets and fiscal 
responsibility, and many recent state government decisions afford greater liberty to citizens than they 
receive under the federal constitution.”). 
 285. See Cross, supra  note 169, at 1325 (“Doctrines such as the plain statement rule and the 
anticommandeering principle are probably the farthest the Court will go in defending federalism.”); 
Powell, supra note 102, at 670 (arguing that “the social reality that virtually all political groups and 
persuasions want broad national powers wielded on behalf of their desired objectives” makes it 
“unlikely that the Court could defy for very long the practical consensus that federal powers should be 
indefinitely broad even if the Justices wished to do so.”). 
 286. See David Wessel, The Long Run Arrives Early, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1999, at A1 
(discussing increasing speed with which capital markets act in rewarding “market -friendly economic 
policies” and sanctioning “wrong-headed economic policies”). 
 287. See generally Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995). 
 288. See McGinnis, supra  note 21, at 593 (“Global opportunities for trade and investment inhibit 
the federal government’s natural tendency toward the expropriation of wealth. If individuals may 
choose where to invest and companies may choose where to produce, they gain leverage against the 
power of the government.”). See also Rodden & Rose-Ackerman, supra  note 85, at 1530 n.45 (citing 
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course, so we can expect attempts to create new levels of government with 
ever-widening jurisdiction.289 These attempts will put pressure on state 
regulation, as efforts to “harmonize” regulation on an international basis may 
be incompatible with the lack of uniformity inherent in a federal system.290 
The collective action problems that governments face in reaching an 
international consensus are perhaps the best hope for liberty. 
If this analysis is correct, federalism at the national level may come to 
have a distinctly secondary role as a structural influence on the creation of 
public policy, despite the best efforts of the Supreme Court.291 It is possible, 
however, that the constrained libertarianism version of constitutional 
federalism may limit the growth of government power and give the United 
States a comparative advantage in the international competition for capital. 
 
 
literature on advantages of inter-jurisdictional competition). 
 289. See Barry Friedman, Federalism’s Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 
1444 (1994). 
Accompanying this internationalization of commerce is a similar process regarding regulatory 
authority. Just as recent years have witnessed the tumbling of international boundaries and 
blockades, there also has been significant growth in both the number of international agreements 
that tie the world together, and the activity of international organizations acting under those 
agreements.  
Id. 
 290. See id . at 1448-50 (discussing pressure of internationalization on state securities laws). 
 291. See SHAPIRO , supra  note 85, at 38 (“[A]t least with respect to capital and to an increasing 
extent with respect to productive and needed workers, the ability to move across international borders 
may be growing to the point that the importance of the right to reject the policies of a particular state 
by moving to another state is a diminishing one. . . . [T]he international mobility of goods, capital, and 
labor is reducing the economic significance of interstate mobility as a means of escaping the restrictive 
or unpopular rules of a particular state.”). 
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